Ok, you are right that I missed the situation of people who say things but fail to live up to them in obvious ways. That is probably simply because I don’t really see this in the religious people I am most acquainted with. My guess is that if we leave out people who are actually not telling the truth about what they believe (i.e. people who are literally lying about what they hold), that happens mainly because of akrasia and other similar situations where their desires are in conflict with their explicit beliefs about what they should do, and they follow their desires instead of their belief. If this is right, it wouldn’t be necessary to make a distinct category of belief here, just as it isn’t necessary to say that I have a “belief in belief” that I should not waste so much time browsing the internet, even if I do it. The desire is a sufficient explanation without having to modify the belief.
About the people virtually certain their religion is false, I should have said “in every way under their control”. In other words it is precisely the voluntary aspects that they are choosing to conform to the belief. But there are many involuntary aspects that reveal the contrary estimate. There are also voluntary actions which are somewhat indifferent, where they could consistently do the action if the thing was true, but they might be somewhat more likely to perform that action if they held the contrary internal estimate. For example, since emotional reactions are somewhat involuntary they can manifest something about it; someone with a high internal estimate of his religion is more likely to react badly in an emotional way to someone else leaving the religion, while someone with a low internal estimate is likely to be more calm about it. Likewise, as an example of the voluntary case, if someone says “I realize there is plenty of evidence against my religion,” this is a somewhat indifferent voluntary action, since it is consistent with the religion being true, but it is more likely to be said by someone who has the low estimate.
someone with a high internal estimate of his religion is more likely to react badly in an emotional way to someone else leaving the religion, while someone with a low internal estimate is likely to be more calm about it.
I don’t think there’s reason to believe that.
If someone says something I know to be utterly false I laugh. There needs to be a basis of doubt to feel bad emotionally.
Ok, you are right that I missed the situation of people who say things but fail to live up to them in obvious ways. That is probably simply because I don’t really see this in the religious people I am most acquainted with. My guess is that if we leave out people who are actually not telling the truth about what they believe (i.e. people who are literally lying about what they hold), that happens mainly because of akrasia and other similar situations where their desires are in conflict with their explicit beliefs about what they should do, and they follow their desires instead of their belief. If this is right, it wouldn’t be necessary to make a distinct category of belief here, just as it isn’t necessary to say that I have a “belief in belief” that I should not waste so much time browsing the internet, even if I do it. The desire is a sufficient explanation without having to modify the belief.
About the people virtually certain their religion is false, I should have said “in every way under their control”. In other words it is precisely the voluntary aspects that they are choosing to conform to the belief. But there are many involuntary aspects that reveal the contrary estimate. There are also voluntary actions which are somewhat indifferent, where they could consistently do the action if the thing was true, but they might be somewhat more likely to perform that action if they held the contrary internal estimate. For example, since emotional reactions are somewhat involuntary they can manifest something about it; someone with a high internal estimate of his religion is more likely to react badly in an emotional way to someone else leaving the religion, while someone with a low internal estimate is likely to be more calm about it. Likewise, as an example of the voluntary case, if someone says “I realize there is plenty of evidence against my religion,” this is a somewhat indifferent voluntary action, since it is consistent with the religion being true, but it is more likely to be said by someone who has the low estimate.
I don’t think there’s reason to believe that.
If someone says something I know to be utterly false I laugh. There needs to be a basis of doubt to feel bad emotionally.
If you think your friend is going to hell for eternity, you feel bad. You don’t need to doubt.