How, specifically, are rough-and-tumble spaces less “rational”, more prone to getting the wrong answer, such that a list of “Elements of Rationalist Discourse” has the authority to designate them as non-default?
You may be right that this one sticks out and hasn’t been abstracted properly. But I do think there are truth-tracking reasons for this that are pretty general. (I think whether these reasons actually hold water is pretty dubious; rough-and-tumble spaces would very plausibly be significantly more truth-tracking than current rationalist norms; I’m just saying that it’s not a type error to put this one on the list.) 1. Carrots are maybe less likely to alienate people than sticks. Alienating people decreases the amount of computing power and information that you have available, making it harder to get the truth. 2. Sticks are more likely to cause schisms and moloch traps, where punishment of non-punishment takes flight into coalitions.
You may be right that this one sticks out and hasn’t been abstracted properly. But I do think there are truth-tracking reasons for this that are pretty general. (I think whether these reasons actually hold water is pretty dubious; rough-and-tumble spaces would very plausibly be significantly more truth-tracking than current rationalist norms; I’m just saying that it’s not a type error to put this one on the list.)
1. Carrots are maybe less likely to alienate people than sticks. Alienating people decreases the amount of computing power and information that you have available, making it harder to get the truth.
2. Sticks are more likely to cause schisms and moloch traps, where punishment of non-punishment takes flight into coalitions.