I think a disanalogy here is that all motors do in fact follow the laws of physics (and convert electricity into rotation, otherwise we wouldn’t call it a motor). Whereas not all discourse systematically leads people towards true beliefs. So rationalist discourse is a strict subset of discourse in a way that physicist motors is not a strict subset of motors.
In general, I agree that we should be open to the possibility that there exist types of discourse that systematically lead people towards true beliefs, but that look very different from “rationalist discourse” as described by Duncan & Rob. That said, I think I’m less impressed by the truth-finding properties of debates / trials than you are. Like, in both legal trials and high-school debate, the pop-culture stereotype is that the side with a better lawyer / debater will win, not the side that is “correct”. But I don’t really know.
I also agree that it’s worth distinguishing “things that seem empirically to lead to truth-finding for normal people in practice” versus “indisputable timeless laws of truth-finding”.
I was reading “Reward others’ good epistemic conduct (e.g., updating) more than most people naturally do.” as like “If somebody else says ‘Hmm, I guess I overstated that’, then I should respond with maybe ‘OK cool, we’re making progress’ and definitely not ‘Ha! So you admit you were wrong! Pfffft!’” If that was indeed the intended meaning, then that doesn’t really seem to be the opposite of what you called “the opposite problem”, I think. But I dunno, I didn’t re-read the original.
I think a disanalogy here is that all motors do in fact follow the laws of physics (and convert electricity into rotation, otherwise we wouldn’t call it a motor). Whereas not all discourse systematically leads people towards true beliefs. So rationalist discourse is a strict subset of discourse in a way that physicist motors is not a strict subset of motors.
In general, I agree that we should be open to the possibility that there exist types of discourse that systematically lead people towards true beliefs, but that look very different from “rationalist discourse” as described by Duncan & Rob. That said, I think I’m less impressed by the truth-finding properties of debates / trials than you are. Like, in both legal trials and high-school debate, the pop-culture stereotype is that the side with a better lawyer / debater will win, not the side that is “correct”. But I don’t really know.
I also agree that it’s worth distinguishing “things that seem empirically to lead to truth-finding for normal people in practice” versus “indisputable timeless laws of truth-finding”.
I was reading “Reward others’ good epistemic conduct (e.g., updating) more than most people naturally do.” as like “If somebody else says ‘Hmm, I guess I overstated that’, then I should respond with maybe ‘OK cool, we’re making progress’ and definitely not ‘Ha! So you admit you were wrong! Pfffft!’” If that was indeed the intended meaning, then that doesn’t really seem to be the opposite of what you called “the opposite problem”, I think. But I dunno, I didn’t re-read the original.
Yep, rationaity is a norm , not a description.