That is a very slippery slope to dualism. I am and therefore I think is more in keeping that how brains evolved. Animals move, therefore they have to know where they are going, therefore they must model reality, therefore they become conscious.
I would like to disagree but I’m so confused by this part of the comment that I don’t know how to write a reply. But for social mores and legal precedence slippery slope arguments are fallacious. After that I lose track of what you’re saying.
It seems to me true that one cannot be mistaken about one’s existence because things that are mistaken are things that exist. The concepts deployed here aren’t necessarily concepts I’m prepared to let Descartes use after he decides to disbelieve everything he is uncertain of, so I don’t think the argument does what Descartes wants it to do. But I’m not obligated to give up these concepts so I can make the argument without qualms. You cannot be mistaken about your existence.
Jack—I seems to me that ‘slippery slope’ may have been a sloppy use on my part. What I meant was that ‘I think therefore I am’ so implies dualism that it would be difficult to avoid it once you accepted the statement. It is a statement that starts with ideas and goes on from there. On the other hand ‘I exist therefore I think’, starts with materialism. The question is not whether we exist or not but whether we know of our existence because of mental thoughts or because of physical reality. I agree that we cannot be mistaken about our existence.
Descartes’ method also implies that in introspection we gain direct knowledge of something. I believe that this is an untenable idea in light of neuroscience. When we see a tree, there is no actual tree inside our skulls, there is a model of a tree. When we experience our thoughts we are likewise experiencing a model of our thoughts. Consciousness is highly processed and in no sense that I know of is it direct knowledge.
The question is not whether we exist or not but whether we know of our existence because of mental thoughts or because of physical reality.
I’m confused: do you intend your category of ‘mental thoughts’ to encompass the whole of subjective experience or just introspection?
If the former, then yes, subjective experience is what any theory of physical reality ultimately has to explain. There’s no reason why your theory could not include a lot of distortion, but you still have to be parsimonious and justify that distortion in some way.
I would like to disagree but I’m so confused by this part of the comment that I don’t know how to write a reply. But for social mores and legal precedence slippery slope arguments are fallacious. After that I lose track of what you’re saying.
It seems to me true that one cannot be mistaken about one’s existence because things that are mistaken are things that exist. The concepts deployed here aren’t necessarily concepts I’m prepared to let Descartes use after he decides to disbelieve everything he is uncertain of, so I don’t think the argument does what Descartes wants it to do. But I’m not obligated to give up these concepts so I can make the argument without qualms. You cannot be mistaken about your existence.
Jack—I seems to me that ‘slippery slope’ may have been a sloppy use on my part. What I meant was that ‘I think therefore I am’ so implies dualism that it would be difficult to avoid it once you accepted the statement. It is a statement that starts with ideas and goes on from there. On the other hand ‘I exist therefore I think’, starts with materialism. The question is not whether we exist or not but whether we know of our existence because of mental thoughts or because of physical reality. I agree that we cannot be mistaken about our existence. Descartes’ method also implies that in introspection we gain direct knowledge of something. I believe that this is an untenable idea in light of neuroscience. When we see a tree, there is no actual tree inside our skulls, there is a model of a tree. When we experience our thoughts we are likewise experiencing a model of our thoughts. Consciousness is highly processed and in no sense that I know of is it direct knowledge.
I’m confused: do you intend your category of ‘mental thoughts’ to encompass the whole of subjective experience or just introspection?
If the former, then yes, subjective experience is what any theory of physical reality ultimately has to explain. There’s no reason why your theory could not include a lot of distortion, but you still have to be parsimonious and justify that distortion in some way.