(You might say that you can’t have mental states without being phenomenally conscious. But hopefully it’s at least clearer why others would find it natural to talk about p-zombies’ mental states, since they’re implementing all the same cognitive algorithms as a human, not just reproducing the same functional behavior.)
(You might say that you can’t have mental states without being phenomenally conscious. But hopefully it’s at least clearer why others would find it natural to talk about p-zombies’ mental states, since they’re implementing all the same cognitive algorithms as a human, not just reproducing the same functional behavior.)
Hmm, maybe it’s worth distinguishing two things that “mental states” might mean:
intermediate states in the process of executing some cognitive algorithm, which have some data associated with them
phenomenological states of conscious experience
I guess you could believe that a p-zombie could have #1, but not #2.
I meant mental states in something more like the #1 sense—and so, I think, does Frankish.
Sure!