I wasn’t going to say anything, but I was disappointed by most of the comments to that post. “How is transgenderedness different from otherkin?” is a blatantly wrong question. It should be answered with “What question are you really asking?”. The question could be standing in for any of these:
Is transgenderedness “legitimate”? Is otherkin “legitimate”?
Should transgender people be respected or ridiculed for their identity? How about otherkin?
Is it okay to fire an employee just because they’re transgender? Just because they’re otherkin?
Should we treat transgendered people the way we treat members of the gender they identify with? Should we treat otherkin like… (like what? There wasn’t any discussion about how otherkin want to be treated.)
Should health insurance plans cover gender-reassignment surgery? I can’t think of an analogous question pertaining to otherkin.
But when I read the thread, only a very few commenters, such as cousin_it, alluded to this approach. I am disappoint.
It seems difficult to discuss applied ethics questions like the ones you propose, while we still disagree so much on meta and normative ethics. “How is transgenderedness different from otherkin?” can also be interpreted as a mostly factual question: what are the differences between transgenderedness and otherkin that might be ethically relevant (to some ethical system that some LWers might have)? That seems easier to answer, after which we can leave the “should” questions for individuals to decide for themselves.
There wasn’t any discussion about how otherkin want to be treated.
It seems safe to guess that it’s a combination of
Having others accept their claims to be physically and/or spiritually other than human (e.g., elven, dragon, vampire, etc.)
Being assigned a social status in accordance with their claims (or at least no lower than typical humans, and certainly not a target of ridicule, etc.)
what are the differences between transgenderedness and otherkin that might be ethically relevant (to some ethical system that some LWers might have)?
Right, so here’s the problem with that kind of conversation: Whenever someone states a fact, it carries an implicit assumption that the fact is ethically relevant in some way. You can’t help but smuggle in normative ethics with your factual claims. Facts become soldiers.
Consider this conversation: “Homosexuality is a choice.” “No, it’s genetic.” “Homosexuality is unnatural.” “No, it’s widespread in the animal kingdom.” “Yes, but...” On the surface, these interlocutors are disputing facts, but it’s clear that they’re really defending their ethical conclusions.
Or: “Racial miscegenation might have a destabilizing effect on society.” “No, it doesn’t.” “How do you know? Have you read studies on this question? We need more information.” The segregationist opinion is winning this battle merely by insinuating that certain factual questions are the ethically relevant ones.
Or: “How is Mormonism different from Roman Catholicism?” “Well, Mormonism isn’t a Christian religion.” “Yes it is, it’s a religion centered on Jesus Christ.” “Yes, but its theology is radically different from that of other branches of Christianity.” In this conversation the pro-Mormon side struggles to attain the title of “Christianity”, so that Mormons will deserve goodwill and fellowship from other Christians.
A sane thing to do would be to have a non-judgmental discussion of just the facts about transgenderedness or otherkin, motivated by genuine curiosity about the phenomenon; and afterwards to have a discussion about practical ethics where participants are open about what moral principles and intuitions they’re using.
I wasn’t going to say anything, but I was disappointed by most of the comments to that post. “How is transgenderedness different from otherkin?” is a blatantly wrong question. It should be answered with “What question are you really asking?”. The question could be standing in for any of these:
Is transgenderedness “legitimate”? Is otherkin “legitimate”?
Should transgender people be respected or ridiculed for their identity? How about otherkin?
Is it okay to fire an employee just because they’re transgender? Just because they’re otherkin?
Should we treat transgendered people the way we treat members of the gender they identify with? Should we treat otherkin like… (like what? There wasn’t any discussion about how otherkin want to be treated.)
Should health insurance plans cover gender-reassignment surgery? I can’t think of an analogous question pertaining to otherkin.
But when I read the thread, only a very few commenters, such as cousin_it, alluded to this approach. I am disappoint.
It seems difficult to discuss applied ethics questions like the ones you propose, while we still disagree so much on meta and normative ethics. “How is transgenderedness different from otherkin?” can also be interpreted as a mostly factual question: what are the differences between transgenderedness and otherkin that might be ethically relevant (to some ethical system that some LWers might have)? That seems easier to answer, after which we can leave the “should” questions for individuals to decide for themselves.
It seems safe to guess that it’s a combination of
Having others accept their claims to be physically and/or spiritually other than human (e.g., elven, dragon, vampire, etc.)
Being assigned a social status in accordance with their claims (or at least no lower than typical humans, and certainly not a target of ridicule, etc.)
Right, so here’s the problem with that kind of conversation: Whenever someone states a fact, it carries an implicit assumption that the fact is ethically relevant in some way. You can’t help but smuggle in normative ethics with your factual claims. Facts become soldiers.
Consider this conversation: “Homosexuality is a choice.” “No, it’s genetic.” “Homosexuality is unnatural.” “No, it’s widespread in the animal kingdom.” “Yes, but...” On the surface, these interlocutors are disputing facts, but it’s clear that they’re really defending their ethical conclusions.
Or: “Racial miscegenation might have a destabilizing effect on society.” “No, it doesn’t.” “How do you know? Have you read studies on this question? We need more information.” The segregationist opinion is winning this battle merely by insinuating that certain factual questions are the ethically relevant ones.
Or: “How is Mormonism different from Roman Catholicism?” “Well, Mormonism isn’t a Christian religion.” “Yes it is, it’s a religion centered on Jesus Christ.” “Yes, but its theology is radically different from that of other branches of Christianity.” In this conversation the pro-Mormon side struggles to attain the title of “Christianity”, so that Mormons will deserve goodwill and fellowship from other Christians.
A sane thing to do would be to have a non-judgmental discussion of just the facts about transgenderedness or otherkin, motivated by genuine curiosity about the phenomenon; and afterwards to have a discussion about practical ethics where participants are open about what moral principles and intuitions they’re using.
There’s also the question: “do intuitions about otherkin tell us anything about how we should think about transgendereds or vice versa?”
Sure. Though that question is liable to lead us astray unless it is asked in conjunction with a concrete question like the ones I listed.
Yes, that’s a good point.