If nothing else, I’m going to be thoroughly citing all the relevant science to back up the basic perspective, which Eliezer didn’t do. And I’ll be explaining directly how pluralistic moral reductionism answers or dissolves traditional questions in metaethics, and how it responds to mainstream metaethical views, which Eliezer mostly didn’t do. And I think I’ll be making it clearer than Eliezer did that rigid designation of value terms to the objects of (something like) second-order desires is not the only useful reduction of moral terms, and that it’s not too profitable to argue endlessly about where to draw the boundary. (We should be arguing about substance not symbol; the debate shouldn’t be about ‘the meaning of right.’) And I’ll be covering in more depth what the cognitive sciences tell us about how our intuitions about morality are generated. And… well, you’ll see.
If nothing else, I’m going to be thoroughly citing all the relevant science to back up the basic perspective, which Eliezer didn’t do. And I’ll be explaining directly how pluralistic moral reductionism answers or dissolves traditional questions in metaethics, and how it responds to mainstream metaethical views, which Eliezer mostly didn’t do. And I think I’ll be making it clearer than Eliezer did that rigid designation of value terms to the objects of (something like) second-order desires is not the only useful reduction of moral terms, and that it’s not too profitable to argue endlessly about where to draw the boundary. (We should be arguing about substance not symbol; the debate shouldn’t be about ‘the meaning of right.’) And I’ll be covering in more depth what the cognitive sciences tell us about how our intuitions about morality are generated. And… well, you’ll see.