Something the conventional story about ethics gets right, with which you seem to disagree, is that ethics is a society-level affair. That is, to justify an action as ethically correct is implicitly to claim that a rational inquiry by society would deem the action acceptable.
Another point convention gets right, and here again you seem to differ, is motivational externalism. That is, a person can judge that X is right without necessarily being motivated to do X. Of course, you’ve given good evolutionary-biological reasons why most of the time moral judgments do motivate, but, I claim, there is no necessary connection. Morality and motivation can diverge, even for psychologically normal people.
I may be misreading you, please correct me if I have.
Something the conventional story about ethics gets right, with which you seem to disagree, is that ethics is a society-level affair. That is, to justify an action as ethically correct is implicitly to claim that a rational inquiry by society would deem the action acceptable.
You’re just redefining “ethics” as what I called “social ethics”, and ignoring the other levels. That’s treating ethics as a platonic ideal rather than as a product of evolution.
Of course, you’ve given good evolutionary-biological reasons why most of the time moral judgments do motivate, but, I claim, there is no necessary connection.
In the view I’m presenting here, judgements by a person’s personal ethics do always motivate action, by definition. Moral judgements computed using society’s ethics don’t directly motivate; the motivation is mediated through the person’s motivation to accept society’s ethics.
I’m not denying other levels, just insisting that “social ethics” is one of the levels.
If you define personal ethics as inherently motivating, then “personal ethics” becomes a technical term. Which is perfectly fine, as long as you recognize it.
Something the conventional story about ethics gets right, with which you seem to disagree, is that ethics is a society-level affair. That is, to justify an action as ethically correct is implicitly to claim that a rational inquiry by society would deem the action acceptable.
Another point convention gets right, and here again you seem to differ, is motivational externalism. That is, a person can judge that X is right without necessarily being motivated to do X. Of course, you’ve given good evolutionary-biological reasons why most of the time moral judgments do motivate, but, I claim, there is no necessary connection. Morality and motivation can diverge, even for psychologically normal people.
I may be misreading you, please correct me if I have.
You’re just redefining “ethics” as what I called “social ethics”, and ignoring the other levels. That’s treating ethics as a platonic ideal rather than as a product of evolution.
In the view I’m presenting here, judgements by a person’s personal ethics do always motivate action, by definition. Moral judgements computed using society’s ethics don’t directly motivate; the motivation is mediated through the person’s motivation to accept society’s ethics.
I’m not denying other levels, just insisting that “social ethics” is one of the levels.
If you define personal ethics as inherently motivating, then “personal ethics” becomes a technical term. Which is perfectly fine, as long as you recognize it.