I’ve saidthings that sound like this before but I want to distance myself from your position here.^
But remember what a utility function is. It’s a way of adding up all your different preferences and coming up with a single number. Coming up with a single number is important, so that all possible outcomes can be ordered. That’s what you need, and ordering is what numbers do. Having two utility functions is like having no utility function at all, because you don’t have an ordering of preferences.
This is all true. But humans do not have utility functions.
Humans are not the coherent, consistent agents you make them out to be. We are capricious, confused, paradoxical and likely insane. When you choose to buy a plasma screen instead of donating to charity you are not acting on an algorithm that weighed the utility of the plasma screen against the utility of giving to charity. You ran one algorithm, call it the ‘far algorithm’ that returned ‘Give to charity’ and another algorithm, call it the ‘near algorithm’ that returned ‘buy the plasma screen’. Then you ran a third which somehow returned ‘indulge myself’ and then you bought a plasma screen. Change a few inputs to the third algorithm- like say put you in a room full of guilt-riddled rich people talking about how much they give to charity- and you’d have done something else. In fact, it is useful to call the far-algorithm your far-self and the near your near-self. Though this is a gross simplification- you are likely more than just a near-self, far-self and over-self.
Fighting for willpower is basically your far-self trying to wrest control of your behavior from your near-self. And both these selves correspond to aspects of society- some aspects tell you to buy a tv, others tell you to give to charity. Most of the discussion on Less Wrong about akrasia occurs between different-far selves; it is something of a conspiracy to overthrow our near-selves.
*Being evil is harder than being good because it requires fighting your far-self while being good does not. But being evil is not the same as being lazy or apathetic.
*Of course, ethics is in part innate and in part a matter of taste. Your bit about supernatural beings is a red herring to me, maybe it had more significance to others.
*People don’t have utility functions but often what they mean when they talk about changing them is giving one self more control over the other selves. Note, this isn’t always about giving the far-self more power. There are people who work too hard, stress out too much and need to modify themselves to have more fun.
*It makes sense to purchase fuzzies and utils separately as something of a truce between your near and far-self. Often, both algorithms are better satisfied that way.
Finally, ‘meta-ethics’ already means something. Do not overload terms unnecessarily and especially don’t do it by misusing prefixes.
^I disagree with what I wrote in February 2010, to some extent.
This is all true. But humans do not have utility functions… Humans are not the coherent, consistent agents you make them out to be.
If you think that’s relevant, you should also go write the same comment on Eliezer’s post on utilons and fuzzies. Having two coherent, consistent utility functions is no more realistic than having one.
If you want to be rational, you need to try to figure out what your values are, and what your utility function is. Humans don’t act consistently. Whether their preferences can be described by a utility function is a more subtle question whose answer is unknown. But in either case, in order to be more rational, you need to be able to approximate your preferences with a utility function.
Fighting for willpower is basically your far-self trying to wrest control of your behavior from your near-self.
You can alternately describe this as the place where the part of your utility function that you call your far self, and the part of your utility function that you call your near self, sum to zero and provide no net information on what to do. You can choose to describe the resultant emotional confusion as “fighting for willpower”. But this leads to the erroneous conclusions I described under the “ethics as willpower” section.
Just to clarify I am not, not, not defending the willpower model you described—I just don’t think willpower, properly understood as a conflict between near and far modes can be left out of an account of human decision making processes. I think the situation is both more complicated and more troubling than both models and don’t think it is rational to force the square peg that is human values into the round hole that is ‘the utility function’.
I’ll agree that willpower may be a useful concept. I’m not providing a full model, though—mostly I want to dismiss the folk-psychology close tie between willpower and morals.
Having two coherent, consistent utility functions is no more realistic than having one.
He never said these “utility functions” are coherent. In fact a large part of the problem is that the “fuzzies” utility function is extremely incoherent.
You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means. A utility function that is incoherent is not a utility function.
If it is acceptable for Eliezer to talk about having two utility functions, one that measures utilons and one that measures fuzzies, then it is equally acceptable to talk about having a single utility function, with respect to the question of whether humans are capable of having utility functions.
A utility function that is incoherent is not a utility function.
I was using the same not-quite strict definition of “utility function” that you seemed to be using in your post. In any case, I don’t believe Eliezer ever called fuzzies a utility function.
If you want to be rational, you need to try to figure out what your values are, and what your utility function is. Humans don’t act consistently. Whether their preferences can be described by a utility function is a more subtle question whose answer is unknown. But in either case, in order to be more rational, you need to be able to approximate your preferences with a utility function.
This is neither here nor there. I have no doubt it can help to approximate your preferences with a utility function. But simply erasing complication by reducing all your preference-like stuff to a utility function decreases the accuracy of your model. You’re ignoring what is really going on inside. So yes, if you try to model humans as holders of single utility functions… morality has nothing to do with willpower! Congrats! But my point is that such a model is far too simple.
You can alternately describe this as the place where the part of your utility function that you call your far self, and the part of your utility function that you call your near self, sum to zero and provide no net information on what to do. You can choose to describe the resultant emotional confusion as “fighting for willpower”.
Well you can do that—it doesn’t seem at all representative of the way choices are made, though.
But this leads to the erroneous conclusions I described under the “ethics as willpower” section.
What erroneous conclusions? What does it predict that is not so?
I’ve said things that sound like this before but I want to distance myself from your position here.^
This is all true. But humans do not have utility functions.
Humans are not the coherent, consistent agents you make them out to be. We are capricious, confused, paradoxical and likely insane. When you choose to buy a plasma screen instead of donating to charity you are not acting on an algorithm that weighed the utility of the plasma screen against the utility of giving to charity. You ran one algorithm, call it the ‘far algorithm’ that returned ‘Give to charity’ and another algorithm, call it the ‘near algorithm’ that returned ‘buy the plasma screen’. Then you ran a third which somehow returned ‘indulge myself’ and then you bought a plasma screen. Change a few inputs to the third algorithm- like say put you in a room full of guilt-riddled rich people talking about how much they give to charity- and you’d have done something else. In fact, it is useful to call the far-algorithm your far-self and the near your near-self. Though this is a gross simplification- you are likely more than just a near-self, far-self and over-self.
Fighting for willpower is basically your far-self trying to wrest control of your behavior from your near-self. And both these selves correspond to aspects of society- some aspects tell you to buy a tv, others tell you to give to charity. Most of the discussion on Less Wrong about akrasia occurs between different-far selves; it is something of a conspiracy to overthrow our near-selves.
*Being evil is harder than being good because it requires fighting your far-self while being good does not. But being evil is not the same as being lazy or apathetic.
*Of course, ethics is in part innate and in part a matter of taste. Your bit about supernatural beings is a red herring to me, maybe it had more significance to others.
*People don’t have utility functions but often what they mean when they talk about changing them is giving one self more control over the other selves. Note, this isn’t always about giving the far-self more power. There are people who work too hard, stress out too much and need to modify themselves to have more fun.
*It makes sense to purchase fuzzies and utils separately as something of a truce between your near and far-self. Often, both algorithms are better satisfied that way.
Finally, ‘meta-ethics’ already means something. Do not overload terms unnecessarily and especially don’t do it by misusing prefixes.
^I disagree with what I wrote in February 2010, to some extent.
If you think that’s relevant, you should also go write the same comment on Eliezer’s post on utilons and fuzzies. Having two coherent, consistent utility functions is no more realistic than having one.
If you want to be rational, you need to try to figure out what your values are, and what your utility function is. Humans don’t act consistently. Whether their preferences can be described by a utility function is a more subtle question whose answer is unknown. But in either case, in order to be more rational, you need to be able to approximate your preferences with a utility function.
You can alternately describe this as the place where the part of your utility function that you call your far self, and the part of your utility function that you call your near self, sum to zero and provide no net information on what to do. You can choose to describe the resultant emotional confusion as “fighting for willpower”. But this leads to the erroneous conclusions I described under the “ethics as willpower” section.
Just to clarify I am not, not, not defending the willpower model you described—I just don’t think willpower, properly understood as a conflict between near and far modes can be left out of an account of human decision making processes. I think the situation is both more complicated and more troubling than both models and don’t think it is rational to force the square peg that is human values into the round hole that is ‘the utility function’.
I’ll agree that willpower may be a useful concept. I’m not providing a full model, though—mostly I want to dismiss the folk-psychology close tie between willpower and morals.
He never said these “utility functions” are coherent. In fact a large part of the problem is that the “fuzzies” utility function is extremely incoherent.
You keep using that word. I do not think it means what you think it means. A utility function that is incoherent is not a utility function.
If it is acceptable for Eliezer to talk about having two utility functions, one that measures utilons and one that measures fuzzies, then it is equally acceptable to talk about having a single utility function, with respect to the question of whether humans are capable of having utility functions.
I was using the same not-quite strict definition of “utility function” that you seemed to be using in your post. In any case, I don’t believe Eliezer ever called fuzzies a utility function.
This is neither here nor there. I have no doubt it can help to approximate your preferences with a utility function. But simply erasing complication by reducing all your preference-like stuff to a utility function decreases the accuracy of your model. You’re ignoring what is really going on inside. So yes, if you try to model humans as holders of single utility functions… morality has nothing to do with willpower! Congrats! But my point is that such a model is far too simple.
Well you can do that—it doesn’t seem at all representative of the way choices are made, though.
What erroneous conclusions? What does it predict that is not so?