To think you should give to charities preventing kids from getting malaria, or making it so that chickens don’t have to languish for their whole life in a cage, you don’t have to think anything controversial about moral philosophy. You just have to think that helping people is really important, and we should help more rather than less! But that’s common sense.
This is not correct, for two reasons:
Thinking that helping people is really important, and that we should help more rather than less, does not suffice to conclude that we should give to charities aimed at doing anything to, with, or about chickens. (Because chickens are not people.)
Thinking that we should help more rather than less—as a general principle that is not bounded or limited by anything—is, actually, a controversial claim of moral philosophy.
There were two different clauses, one about malaria and the other about chickens. “Helping people is really important” clearly applies to the malaria clause, and there’s a modified version of the statement (“helping animals is really important”) that applies to the chickens clause. I think writing it that way was an acceptable compromise to simplify the language and it’s pretty obvious to me what it was supposed to mean.
“We should help more rather than less, with no bounds/limitations” is not a necessary claim. It’s only necessary to claim “we should help more rather than less if we are currently helping at an extremely low level”.
There were two different clauses, one about malaria and the other about chickens. “Helping people is really important” clearly applies to the malaria clause, and there’s a modified version of the statement (“helping animals is really important”) that applies to the chickens clause. I think writing it that way was an acceptable compromise to simplify the language and it’s pretty obvious to me what it was supposed to mean.
A strange objection—since if you are correct and this is what was meant, then it strengthens my point. If thinking that helping people is really important AND that we should help more rather than less doesn’t suffice to conclude that we should give to chicken-related charities, then still less does merely one of those two premises suffice.
(And “helping animals is really important” is, of course, quite far from an uncontroversial claim.)
“We should help more rather than less, with no bounds/limitations” is not a necessary claim. It’s only necessary to claim “we should help more rather than less if we are currently helping at an extremely low level”.
No, this does not suffice. It would only suffice if giving to chicken-related charities were the first (or close to the first) charity that we’d wish to give to, if we were increasing our helping from an extremely low level to a higher one. Otherwise, if we believe, for instance, that helping a little is better than none, and helping a reasonable and moderate amount is better than helping a little, but helping a very large amount is worse (or even just no better) than the preceding, then this threshold may easily be reached long before we get anywhere near chickens (or any other specific cause). In order to guarantee the “we should give to chicken-related charities” conclusion, the “helping more is better than helping less” principle must be unbounded and unlimited.
This is not correct, for two reasons:
Thinking that helping people is really important, and that we should help more rather than less, does not suffice to conclude that we should give to charities aimed at doing anything to, with, or about chickens. (Because chickens are not people.)
Thinking that we should help more rather than less—as a general principle that is not bounded or limited by anything—is, actually, a controversial claim of moral philosophy.
There were two different clauses, one about malaria and the other about chickens. “Helping people is really important” clearly applies to the malaria clause, and there’s a modified version of the statement (“helping animals is really important”) that applies to the chickens clause. I think writing it that way was an acceptable compromise to simplify the language and it’s pretty obvious to me what it was supposed to mean.
“We should help more rather than less, with no bounds/limitations” is not a necessary claim. It’s only necessary to claim “we should help more rather than less if we are currently helping at an extremely low level”.
A strange objection—since if you are correct and this is what was meant, then it strengthens my point. If thinking that helping people is really important AND that we should help more rather than less doesn’t suffice to conclude that we should give to chicken-related charities, then still less does merely one of those two premises suffice.
(And “helping animals is really important” is, of course, quite far from an uncontroversial claim.)
No, this does not suffice. It would only suffice if giving to chicken-related charities were the first (or close to the first) charity that we’d wish to give to, if we were increasing our helping from an extremely low level to a higher one. Otherwise, if we believe, for instance, that helping a little is better than none, and helping a reasonable and moderate amount is better than helping a little, but helping a very large amount is worse (or even just no better) than the preceding, then this threshold may easily be reached long before we get anywhere near chickens (or any other specific cause). In order to guarantee the “we should give to chicken-related charities” conclusion, the “helping more is better than helping less” principle must be unbounded and unlimited.