I’m not sure your (or his) argument actually addresses popular beliefs.
I still think it relevant:
ad 1.: that might be so, but it’s not all there is to reductionism, at least according to this or that attempt.
ad 2.: that might be so, but it’s nonetheless a theory people rather easily catch, along with reductionism. For example: If you take reductionism for granted, and some entity does not easily fit it, then you are seduced into eliminating that entity.
Eliezer makes the further claim in those pieces that non-reductionism is based on confusion and doesn’t lead to a coherent worldview, but that’s not a property of reductionism.
| If you take reductionism for granted, and some entity does not easily fit it, then you are seduced into eliminating that entity.
Are there any actual individuals you have in mind when you make this generalization? To my knowledge, I have never heard of an individual ignoring observed phenomena they could not predict reductively.
Ok, I wasn’t specific enough.
I meant mainly that Eliezer also claimed that there is a fundamental level and that there are no funda-mental entities.
Are there any actual individuals you have in mind when you make this generalization? To my knowledge, I have never heard of an individual ignoring observed phenomena they could not predict reductively.
I take it you mean explain reductively?
Anyway, behaviourism (and its problems with mental entities) seems the locus classicus. Or what about eliminativists like the churchlands or dennett (for qualia)? Or hartry field for numbers? There must be lots of others.
Point taken. Nevertheless, the fact that people draw absurd conclusions from a belief has no bearing on whether that belief should be questioned unless those absurd conclusions are (1) logical, rather than philosophical, inferences, and (2) contrary to evidence. Those conditions do not hold for reductionism (and Dennett, in particular, had a few things to say about “greedy reductionism”).
A logical inference is inescapable. If the universe is purely deterministic, then everything that happens tomorrow can be predicted from a complete description of the laws of nature and state of the universe at this exact instant—this is a logical inference. But if the universe is purely deterministic, then the people in the universe might be fully responsible for their acts or they might not—philosophers have drawn both inferences, because the deduction depends on additional premises not stated in the syllogism.
Likewise, the inference from reductionism to the conclusion that ordinary things do not exist—what Dennett called “greedy reductionism”, and what you^H^H^Hspuckblase (sorry, didn’t look at the names!) offered Schaffer’s beliefs as an anodyne to—has been argued, but has also been denied, by philosophers. Its validity depends on other premises, such as what it means to exist.
I still think it relevant:
ad 1.: that might be so, but it’s not all there is to reductionism, at least according to this or that attempt.
ad 2.: that might be so, but it’s nonetheless a theory people rather easily catch, along with reductionism. For example: If you take reductionism for granted, and some entity does not easily fit it, then you are seduced into eliminating that entity.
Eliezer makes the further claim in those pieces that non-reductionism is based on confusion and doesn’t lead to a coherent worldview, but that’s not a property of reductionism.
| If you take reductionism for granted, and some entity does not easily fit it, then you are seduced into eliminating that entity.
Are there any actual individuals you have in mind when you make this generalization? To my knowledge, I have never heard of an individual ignoring observed phenomena they could not predict reductively.
Ok, I wasn’t specific enough. I meant mainly that Eliezer also claimed that there is a fundamental level and that there are no funda-mental entities.
I take it you mean explain reductively? Anyway, behaviourism (and its problems with mental entities) seems the locus classicus. Or what about eliminativists like the churchlands or dennett (for qualia)? Or hartry field for numbers? There must be lots of others.
Point taken. Nevertheless, the fact that people draw absurd conclusions from a belief has no bearing on whether that belief should be questioned unless those absurd conclusions are (1) logical, rather than philosophical, inferences, and (2) contrary to evidence. Those conditions do not hold for reductionism (and Dennett, in particular, had a few things to say about “greedy reductionism”).
I’m not sure what you mean by ‘logical, rather than philosophical, inferences’. Aren’t most (all?) philosophical inferences logical?
A logical inference is inescapable. If the universe is purely deterministic, then everything that happens tomorrow can be predicted from a complete description of the laws of nature and state of the universe at this exact instant—this is a logical inference. But if the universe is purely deterministic, then the people in the universe might be fully responsible for their acts or they might not—philosophers have drawn both inferences, because the deduction depends on additional premises not stated in the syllogism.
Likewise, the inference from reductionism to the conclusion that ordinary things do not exist—what Dennett called “greedy reductionism”, and what you^H^H^Hspuckblase (sorry, didn’t look at the names!) offered Schaffer’s beliefs as an anodyne to—has been argued, but has also been denied, by philosophers. Its validity depends on other premises, such as what it means to exist.