This is a good point in the sense that communication between the researchers could in theory make all of them converge to the same beliefs, but it assumes that they all communicate absolutely every belief to everyone else faster than any of them can form new beliefs from empirical evidence.
But either way it’s not a crux to the main ideas in the post. My point with assuming they’re perfectly rational is to show that there are systemic biases independent of the personal biases human researchers usually have.
No, if there is common knowledge of rationality then Aumann’s Agreement Theorem beats evidential luck.
Maybe the “everyone’s rational” world still allows different people to have different priors, not just evidence?
Right, good point. Edited to point out that same priors (or the same complexity measure for assigning priors) is indeed a prerequisite. Thanks!
This is a good point in the sense that communication between the researchers could in theory make all of them converge to the same beliefs, but it assumes that they all communicate absolutely every belief to everyone else faster than any of them can form new beliefs from empirical evidence.
But either way it’s not a crux to the main ideas in the post. My point with assuming they’re perfectly rational is to show that there are systemic biases independent of the personal biases human researchers usually have.
(Edit: It was not I who downvoted your comment.)