The point of the destructive upload is precisely so that you-now can anticipate continuing only as the upload.
Except I don’t anticipate continuing only as the upload; I anticipate being dead. Uploaded-me will remember incorrectly anticipating the same, but uploaded-me was not the one doing the anticipating.
I am an instance of a class, not the class itself.
Actually, tabooing “I”, since it seems to be getting in the way: This instance of the class anticipates that this instance will be dead, and has a problem with that even if other instance(s) of the class remain.
There is one instance. It forks. There are two instances. If you claim that one of them was the original instance, you are using “I”.
I’d say that past!you, upload!you, and meat!you are three distinct instances of the class you. Thinking you’re going to die means that past!you does not believe that there is a future!you.
Well, yes. What I was trying to do was avert a confusion where “I” might refer to an instance (meat brain, silicon RAM copy #224) or might refer to a class (the abstract computation they’re both running), by specifying the intended meaning. That is the point of tabooing, right?
I’d say that past!you, upload!you, and meat!you are three distinct instances of the class you.
Thanks; this seems to be the source of disagreement. I see two instances, not three, the second forking at the moment of upload and running the same program with a new PID. I don’t think we’ll find common ground here, and I’m not sure I’m up to defending my position on the subject. I just found the consequences of that position interesting to explore.
Uploaded-me will remember incorrectly anticipating the same, but uploaded-me was not the one doing the anticipating.
Fine, but we’re still talking past each other, because I think there is no sense in which dead meat-you “was” the one doing the anticipating that is not also true of live upload-you.
I am an instance of a class, not the class itself.
So the whole point of this, as I understood it, was that the universe doesn’t support persistent instances in the way you want it to.
You could follow e.g. Mitchell Porter (as far as I understood him) and claim that there’s a particular quantum doohickey that does support real fundamental continuity of stuff. Do you? Or am I wildly misinterpreting you?
For the record, (this instance of this class) has no problems with the destruction of (other instances of this class or itself), so long as at least one instance remains and is viable, and a handful of similarity conditions are met.
Seriously. We can talk about it on lw chat some time if you’re bored.
Except I don’t anticipate continuing only as the upload; I anticipate being dead. Uploaded-me will remember incorrectly anticipating the same, but uploaded-me was not the one doing the anticipating.
I am an instance of a class, not the class itself.
Actually, tabooing “I”, since it seems to be getting in the way: This instance of the class anticipates that this instance will be dead, and has a problem with that even if other instance(s) of the class remain.
That’s the same as “I”.
There is one instance. It forks. There are two instances. If you claim that one of them was the original instance, you are using “I”.
I’d say that past!you, upload!you, and meat!you are three distinct instances of the class you. Thinking you’re going to die means that past!you does not believe that there is a future!you.
Well, yes. What I was trying to do was avert a confusion where “I” might refer to an instance (meat brain, silicon RAM copy #224) or might refer to a class (the abstract computation they’re both running), by specifying the intended meaning. That is the point of tabooing, right?
Thanks; this seems to be the source of disagreement. I see two instances, not three, the second forking at the moment of upload and running the same program with a new PID. I don’t think we’ll find common ground here, and I’m not sure I’m up to defending my position on the subject. I just found the consequences of that position interesting to explore.
Fine, but we’re still talking past each other, because I think there is no sense in which dead meat-you “was” the one doing the anticipating that is not also true of live upload-you.
So the whole point of this, as I understood it, was that the universe doesn’t support persistent instances in the way you want it to.
You could follow e.g. Mitchell Porter (as far as I understood him) and claim that there’s a particular quantum doohickey that does support real fundamental continuity of stuff. Do you? Or am I wildly misinterpreting you?
For the record, (this instance of this class) has no problems with the destruction of (other instances of this class or itself), so long as at least one instance remains and is viable, and a handful of similarity conditions are met.
Seriously. We can talk about it on lw chat some time if you’re bored.