Just because the machine version remembers what the meat version did, doesn’t mean the conscious meat version didn’t die in the uploading process. Nothing you have said negates the death + birth interpretation. Your definitions are still missing the point.
Sure, something particular happens to the meat version. But (it is asserted) that thing happens to you all the time anyway and nobody cares. So the objection is to you wasting the nice short code “death” on such an unimportant process. This is a way in which words can be wrong.
Strawman assertion. Even while unconscious / asleep / anesthetized there is still a jumbled assortment of interdependent interactions going on in my brain. Those don’t get broken apart and dematerialized “all the time” the way they do when being destructively uploaded.
Yes, uploading brains is going to be incredibly difficult and possibly impossible; and if any kind of upload process is sufficiently noisy or imperfect, that that surely could result in something better described as a death-and-creation than a continuation. For the purpose of the argument, I thought we were assuming a solved, accurate upload process.
When you introduce something which is irrelevant and misses the point, and then use that to dismiss an argument, yes that is a strawman.
Back to the original issue, the “upload” scenario is usually expressed in the form: (1) somehow scan the brain to sufficient resolution, and (2) create a computer simulation using that data. Even if the scan and simulation were absolutely prefect, better than quantum physics actually allows, it still would be death-and-creation under the OP’s framework.
I can’t tell from your post if you are including “slowly transition brain into electronic medium” under the category of “uploading”, but that is usually grouped under intelligence augmentation, and I don’t know any material reductionalist who thinks that would be a death-and-creation.
Just because the machine version remembers what the meat version did, doesn’t mean the conscious meat version didn’t die in the uploading process. Nothing you have said negates the death + birth interpretation. Your definitions are still missing the point.
Sure, something particular happens to the meat version. But (it is asserted) that thing happens to you all the time anyway and nobody cares. So the objection is to you wasting the nice short code “death” on such an unimportant process. This is a way in which words can be wrong.
Strawman assertion. Even while unconscious / asleep / anesthetized there is still a jumbled assortment of interdependent interactions going on in my brain. Those don’t get broken apart and dematerialized “all the time” the way they do when being destructively uploaded.
That’s not what strawman means. If you think what I’ve said is irrelevant or misses your point, say that.
As I said to Error, above, I’m referring to this.
Yes, uploading brains is going to be incredibly difficult and possibly impossible; and if any kind of upload process is sufficiently noisy or imperfect, that that surely could result in something better described as a death-and-creation than a continuation. For the purpose of the argument, I thought we were assuming a solved, accurate upload process.
When you introduce something which is irrelevant and misses the point, and then use that to dismiss an argument, yes that is a strawman.
Back to the original issue, the “upload” scenario is usually expressed in the form: (1) somehow scan the brain to sufficient resolution, and (2) create a computer simulation using that data. Even if the scan and simulation were absolutely prefect, better than quantum physics actually allows, it still would be death-and-creation under the OP’s framework.
I can’t tell from your post if you are including “slowly transition brain into electronic medium” under the category of “uploading”, but that is usually grouped under intelligence augmentation, and I don’t know any material reductionalist who thinks that would be a death-and-creation.