The justification for pruning this neuron seems to me to be that if you can explain basically everything without using a dualistic view, it is so much simpler. The two hypotheses are possible, but you want to go with the simpler hypothesis, and a world with only (physical properties) is simpler than a world with (physical properties + mental properties).
Argument needed! You cannot go from “H1 asserts the existence of more stuff than H2” to “H1 is more complex than H2″. Complexity is measured as the length of the program that implements a hypothesis, not as the # of objects created by the hypothesis.
The argument goes through for Epiphenomenalism specifically (bc you can just get rid of the code that creates mental properties) but not in general.
Argument needed! You cannot go from “H1 asserts the existence of more stuff than H2” to “H1 is more complex than H2″. Complexity is measured as the length of the program that implements a hypothesis, not as the # of objects created by the hypothesis.
The argument goes through for Epiphenomenalism specifically (bc you can just get rid of the code that creates mental properties) but not in general.