I think the danger here is far smaller than people are making it out to be. There is a major difference between the label “rationalist” and most other identities as Paul Graham refers to them. The difference is that “rationalist” is a procedural label; most identities are at least partially substantive, using procedural/substantive in the sense that the legal system does.
“Rationalist,” which I agree is an inevitable shorthand that emerges when the topic of overcoming bias is discussed frequently, is exclusively a procedural label: such a person is expected to make decisions and seek truth using a certain process. This process includes Bayesian updating of priors based on evidence, etc. However, such a label doesn’t commit the rationalist to any particular conclusion ex ante: the rationalist doesn’t have to be atheist or theist, or accept any other fact as true and virtually unassailable. He’s merely committed to the process of arriving at conclusions.
Other identities are largely substantive. They commit the bearer to certain conclusions about the state of the world. A Christian believes in a god with certain attributes and a certain history of the world. A Communist believes that a certain government system is better than all others. These identities are dangerous: once they commit you to a conclusion, you’re unlikely to challenge it with evidence to ensure it is in fact the best one. That’s the kind of identity Paul Graham is warning against.
Of course, these labels have procedural components: a Christian would solve a moral dilemma using the Bible; a Communist would solve an economic problem using communist theory. Similarly, rationalism substantively means you’ve arrived at the conclusion than you’re biased and you can’t trust your gut or your brain like most people do, but that’s the extent of your substantive assumptions.
Since rationalism is a procedural identity rather than a substantive one, I see few of the dangers of using the term “rationalist” freely here.
Why should we think of beliefs about proper procedure as less prone to reifying identity formation than beliefs about things other than procedures? How are beliefs about the best procedure for reasoning or predicting not beliefs about the state of the world? Specifically, are such beliefs not beliefs about the human brain and how it functions? Aren’t we all pretty committed to the view that updating priors is a better way of getting things right than praying for the answer? I don’t see why beliefs about procedure aren’t just as liable to be let by as unchallenged assumption as are beliefs about political systems.
Besides, we’d be kidding ourselves if we said that the less wrong community has no shared beliefs other than about procedure. Yeah, a rationalist doesn’t have to be an atheist… but there aren’t a lot of outspoken evangelicals around these parts. It remains very possible that some or most of us could come to associate other beliefs with the rationalist label, even if the label doesn’t explicitly include them right now.
There are lots of reasons to call ourselves rationalists- but lets try not to dupe ourselves into thinking we’re so special none of the problems with labeling will apply to us.
I’m inclined to agree on your latter point: looking at the results of the survey, it seems like it would be easy to go from ‘rationalist’ as a procedural label to ‘rationalist’ as shorthand for ‘atheist male computer programmer using bayesian rules.’ Of course, that’s a common bias, and I think this community is as ready as any to fight it.
As for the former, I tried to address that by pointing out that rationalism means that we’ve already decided that updating priors is more effective than prayer. That said, I have a perhaps idealistic view of rationality, in that I think it’s flexible enough to destroy itself, if necessary. I’d like to think that if we learned that our way of reasoning is inferior, we’d readily abandon it. A little too idealistic, perhaps.
That said, I will say that I find purely procedural labels less dangerous than substantive ones. You’ve alluded to the danger of conflating it with substantive labels like atheism, but that’s a separate danger worth looking out for.
So it might be the case that bayesian updating has some quirky memetic mutation that could lead it to destroy itself if it stopped working. Maybe so-called ‘rationalism’ is especially bad at absorbing internal contradictions. But this would be a feature of they belief itself—not a feature of it being a belief about procedure. Many beliefs about procedure are exactly the opposite—take believing that truth can be taken from the Bible. That procedure is self-justifying and there is no way to dispute it from within the assumptions of the procedure.
Mostly, I just don’t think the distinction you are trying to make between “procedural” and “substantive” beliefs holds water. Beliefs about political theory and economics, for example, are almost all procedural beliefs (i.e. the right procedure for making a law or stimulating the economy). What about them would make them immune to labeling problems?
“Many beliefs about procedure are exactly the opposite—take believing that truth can be taken from the Bible. That procedure is self-justifying and there is no way to dispute it from within the assumptions of the procedure.”
That’s my point about rationality—the way I think about it, it would catch its own contradictions. In essence, a rationalist would recognize that rationalists don’t “win.” So as a result, committing yourself to rationality doesn’t actually commit you to an outcome, as perhaps following a scripture would.
The bigger problem, I believe, is that most professed commitment to a procedure is superficial, and that instead most people simply bend the procedure to a preferred outcome. “The Devil may cite scripture for his purpose.” The key, of course, is following the procedure accurately, and this is the community that’ll keep you in line if you try to bend procedure to your preferred conclusion.
“So as a result, committing yourself to rationality doesn’t actually commit you to an outcome, as perhaps following a scripture would.”
Doesn’t committing yourself to rationality commit you to the outcome that so and so “will be rational”? I’m not saying that this is the same exact thing as what evangelical christians do, where they actually twist the lines to reason to their preferred conclusion. But it’s like Jack said, don’t dupe yourself into thinking none of the problems with labeling will apply to you. That’s where you get into a tricky place, because you are ignoring a piece of information that does not jibe with your preferred view of yourself.
Some people here have argued that ‘rationalist’ refers to someone who wants to act rationally, as opposed to someone who actually puts the necessary techniques into practice.
I think the danger is far greater than you suspect.
I think the danger here is far smaller than people are making it out to be. There is a major difference between the label “rationalist” and most other identities as Paul Graham refers to them. The difference is that “rationalist” is a procedural label; most identities are at least partially substantive, using procedural/substantive in the sense that the legal system does.
“Rationalist,” which I agree is an inevitable shorthand that emerges when the topic of overcoming bias is discussed frequently, is exclusively a procedural label: such a person is expected to make decisions and seek truth using a certain process. This process includes Bayesian updating of priors based on evidence, etc. However, such a label doesn’t commit the rationalist to any particular conclusion ex ante: the rationalist doesn’t have to be atheist or theist, or accept any other fact as true and virtually unassailable. He’s merely committed to the process of arriving at conclusions.
Other identities are largely substantive. They commit the bearer to certain conclusions about the state of the world. A Christian believes in a god with certain attributes and a certain history of the world. A Communist believes that a certain government system is better than all others. These identities are dangerous: once they commit you to a conclusion, you’re unlikely to challenge it with evidence to ensure it is in fact the best one. That’s the kind of identity Paul Graham is warning against.
Of course, these labels have procedural components: a Christian would solve a moral dilemma using the Bible; a Communist would solve an economic problem using communist theory. Similarly, rationalism substantively means you’ve arrived at the conclusion than you’re biased and you can’t trust your gut or your brain like most people do, but that’s the extent of your substantive assumptions.
Since rationalism is a procedural identity rather than a substantive one, I see few of the dangers of using the term “rationalist” freely here.
Why should we think of beliefs about proper procedure as less prone to reifying identity formation than beliefs about things other than procedures? How are beliefs about the best procedure for reasoning or predicting not beliefs about the state of the world? Specifically, are such beliefs not beliefs about the human brain and how it functions? Aren’t we all pretty committed to the view that updating priors is a better way of getting things right than praying for the answer? I don’t see why beliefs about procedure aren’t just as liable to be let by as unchallenged assumption as are beliefs about political systems.
Besides, we’d be kidding ourselves if we said that the less wrong community has no shared beliefs other than about procedure. Yeah, a rationalist doesn’t have to be an atheist… but there aren’t a lot of outspoken evangelicals around these parts. It remains very possible that some or most of us could come to associate other beliefs with the rationalist label, even if the label doesn’t explicitly include them right now.
There are lots of reasons to call ourselves rationalists- but lets try not to dupe ourselves into thinking we’re so special none of the problems with labeling will apply to us.
I’m inclined to agree on your latter point: looking at the results of the survey, it seems like it would be easy to go from ‘rationalist’ as a procedural label to ‘rationalist’ as shorthand for ‘atheist male computer programmer using bayesian rules.’ Of course, that’s a common bias, and I think this community is as ready as any to fight it.
As for the former, I tried to address that by pointing out that rationalism means that we’ve already decided that updating priors is more effective than prayer. That said, I have a perhaps idealistic view of rationality, in that I think it’s flexible enough to destroy itself, if necessary. I’d like to think that if we learned that our way of reasoning is inferior, we’d readily abandon it. A little too idealistic, perhaps.
That said, I will say that I find purely procedural labels less dangerous than substantive ones. You’ve alluded to the danger of conflating it with substantive labels like atheism, but that’s a separate danger worth looking out for.
So it might be the case that bayesian updating has some quirky memetic mutation that could lead it to destroy itself if it stopped working. Maybe so-called ‘rationalism’ is especially bad at absorbing internal contradictions. But this would be a feature of they belief itself—not a feature of it being a belief about procedure. Many beliefs about procedure are exactly the opposite—take believing that truth can be taken from the Bible. That procedure is self-justifying and there is no way to dispute it from within the assumptions of the procedure.
Mostly, I just don’t think the distinction you are trying to make between “procedural” and “substantive” beliefs holds water. Beliefs about political theory and economics, for example, are almost all procedural beliefs (i.e. the right procedure for making a law or stimulating the economy). What about them would make them immune to labeling problems?
“Many beliefs about procedure are exactly the opposite—take believing that truth can be taken from the Bible. That procedure is self-justifying and there is no way to dispute it from within the assumptions of the procedure.”
That’s my point about rationality—the way I think about it, it would catch its own contradictions. In essence, a rationalist would recognize that rationalists don’t “win.” So as a result, committing yourself to rationality doesn’t actually commit you to an outcome, as perhaps following a scripture would.
The bigger problem, I believe, is that most professed commitment to a procedure is superficial, and that instead most people simply bend the procedure to a preferred outcome. “The Devil may cite scripture for his purpose.” The key, of course, is following the procedure accurately, and this is the community that’ll keep you in line if you try to bend procedure to your preferred conclusion.
“So as a result, committing yourself to rationality doesn’t actually commit you to an outcome, as perhaps following a scripture would.”
Doesn’t committing yourself to rationality commit you to the outcome that so and so “will be rational”? I’m not saying that this is the same exact thing as what evangelical christians do, where they actually twist the lines to reason to their preferred conclusion. But it’s like Jack said, don’t dupe yourself into thinking none of the problems with labeling will apply to you. That’s where you get into a tricky place, because you are ignoring a piece of information that does not jibe with your preferred view of yourself.
Some people here have argued that ‘rationalist’ refers to someone who wants to act rationally, as opposed to someone who actually puts the necessary techniques into practice.
I think the danger is far greater than you suspect.