What do you mean by “already started”? An EDT agent doesn’t really care about time, because it doesn’t care about causation.
Take Parfit’s hitchhiker. An EDT agent that’s stuck in the desert will self-modify in such a way that, when someone offers to pick him up, he knows he’ll keep the promise to pay them. If an EDT agent has already been picked up and now has to make the choice to pay the guy (perhaps he became EDT when he had an epiphany during the ride), he won’t pay, because he already knows he got the ride and doesn’t want to waste the money.
An EDT agent that’s stuck in the desert will self-modify in such a way that, when someone offers to pick him up, he knows he’ll keep the promise to pay them.
If the agent is able to credibly commit (I assume that’s what you mean by self modification), he doesn’t have to do that in advance. He can just commit when he’s offered the ride.
On a side note, the entry you linked says:
This is the dilemma of Parfit’s Hitchhiker, and the above is the standard resolution according to mainstream philosophy’s causal decision theory
Is it actually correct that causal decision theory is mainstream? I was under the impression that EDT is mainstream, so much that is usually referred to just as decision theory.
He can in that example. There are others where he can’t. For example, the guy picking him up might have other ways of figuring out if he’d pay, and not explain what’s going on until the ride, when it’s too late to commit.
Is it actually correct that causal decision theory is mainstream?
I don’t know. Both of them are major enough to have Wikipedia articles. I’ve heard that philosophers are split on Newcomb’s paradox, which would separate CDTers and EDTers.
In any case, both decision theories give the same answer for Parfit’s hitchhiker.
Okay, that’s what I thought. So this has nothing to do with time, in the sense of what happens first, but rather the agent’s current state of knowledge, in the sense of what it already knows about. Thanks for clarifying. I’m just not convinced that this is a bug, rather than a feature, for an agent that can make arbitrary precommitments.
Take Parfit’s hitchhiker. An EDT agent that’s stuck in the desert will self-modify in such a way that, when someone offers to pick him up, he knows he’ll keep the promise to pay them. If an EDT agent has already been picked up and now has to make the choice to pay the guy (perhaps he became EDT when he had an epiphany during the ride), he won’t pay, because he already knows he got the ride and doesn’t want to waste the money.
If the agent is able to credibly commit (I assume that’s what you mean by self modification), he doesn’t have to do that in advance. He can just commit when he’s offered the ride.
On a side note, the entry you linked says:
Is it actually correct that causal decision theory is mainstream? I was under the impression that EDT is mainstream, so much that is usually referred to just as decision theory.
He can in that example. There are others where he can’t. For example, the guy picking him up might have other ways of figuring out if he’d pay, and not explain what’s going on until the ride, when it’s too late to commit.
I don’t know. Both of them are major enough to have Wikipedia articles. I’ve heard that philosophers are split on Newcomb’s paradox, which would separate CDTers and EDTers.
In any case, both decision theories give the same answer for Parfit’s hitchhiker.
Okay, that’s what I thought. So this has nothing to do with time, in the sense of what happens first, but rather the agent’s current state of knowledge, in the sense of what it already knows about. Thanks for clarifying. I’m just not convinced that this is a bug, rather than a feature, for an agent that can make arbitrary precommitments.