Oh, also don’t over-extend the phrase “resist extortion in blackmail dilemmas” to mean “turn down all blackmail”. Causal normal blackmail is still a straightforward EV calculation (including the estimate of blackmailer defection or future harms). Only “blackmail dilemmas”, like acausal or reverse-causality or infinitessimal calculations are discussed in the paper.
Yeah, my argument here is not contradicting the paper, because the case of a TDT agent blackmailing a TDT agent is not discussed. I just wanted to know whether the resistance against blackmail extortion still applies in this case, because I think it doesn’t.
But in some situations the logic can absolutely be applied to “normal causal blackmail”. If a CDT agent sends a completely normal blackmail to a TDT agent, and if the CDT agent is capable of perfectly predicting the TDT agent, then that is precisely the situation in which resisting the extortion makes sense. In this situation, if the TDT agent resists the extortion, then the CDT will be able to predict that, and since he is a CDT he will just do a simple EV calculation and not send the blackmail. So I think it does apply to completely normal blackmail scenarios, as long as the CDT is insanely intelligent.
Oh, also don’t over-extend the phrase “resist extortion in blackmail dilemmas” to mean “turn down all blackmail”. Causal normal blackmail is still a straightforward EV calculation (including the estimate of blackmailer defection or future harms). Only “blackmail dilemmas”, like acausal or reverse-causality or infinitessimal calculations are discussed in the paper.
Yeah, my argument here is not contradicting the paper,
because the case of a TDT agent blackmailing a TDT agent is not discussed.
I just wanted to know whether the resistance against blackmail extortion still applies in this case,
because I think it doesn’t.
But in some situations the logic can absolutely be applied to “normal causal blackmail”.
If a CDT agent sends a completely normal blackmail to a TDT agent,
and if the CDT agent is capable of perfectly predicting the TDT agent,
then that is precisely the situation in which resisting the extortion makes sense.
In this situation, if the TDT agent resists the extortion, then the CDT will be able to predict that,
and since he is a CDT he will just do a simple EV calculation and not send the blackmail.
So I think it does apply to completely normal blackmail scenarios, as long as the CDT is insanely intelligent.