In this example, though, we’re the Confederate War Veterans—it seems rational, given our preferences, to crush the dreams of the future. (Or to alternate to an example with different affect: it’s rational for, say, an idealistic young lawyer to take precautions to ensure she doesn’t become an old scumbag lawyer, even if she know the old scumbag would be very happy those precautions had not been taken.)
Of course, perhaps Jim Crow was not the true implementation of Confederate CEV; they would have preferred different things if they had been more informed about the world and more the people they wanted to be, and so on. But in that case Confederates should expect that their future selves should more faithfully execute the real CEV as they become more informed, unless they don’t trust themselves (suppose I like fairness but like myself being on top slightly more, and that at after a certain point future-me is sufficiently unlike me that I’d prefer he not be on top (even though he will, since he will my preference set) - in that case it’s rational for me to precommit to stepping down after a certain time.)
So upon reflection this is a valid concern to the extent that 1) we don’t trust ourselves to implement our current CEV better than our successors and 2) we don’t trust our precommitment mechanism to work either. Of course “our” CEVs probably vary enough that there’s not a single useful answer here.
Indeed, one recurring problem is that we are who we are and not who we want to be. It’s easier to get Our Hypothetical Racist Grandparents to agree that the premises of racism are wrong but it will be harder to get them not to be upset by at the thought of their granddaughter marrying one, even if they know they shouldn’t be and actually do want to change.
Maybe someday we’ll invent brainwashing that works?
In this example, though, we’re the Confederate War Veterans—it seems rational, given our preferences, to crush the dreams of the future. (Or to alternate to an example with different affect: it’s rational for, say, an idealistic young lawyer to take precautions to ensure she doesn’t become an old scumbag lawyer, even if she know the old scumbag would be very happy those precautions had not been taken.)
Of course, perhaps Jim Crow was not the true implementation of Confederate CEV; they would have preferred different things if they had been more informed about the world and more the people they wanted to be, and so on. But in that case Confederates should expect that their future selves should more faithfully execute the real CEV as they become more informed, unless they don’t trust themselves (suppose I like fairness but like myself being on top slightly more, and that at after a certain point future-me is sufficiently unlike me that I’d prefer he not be on top (even though he will, since he will my preference set) - in that case it’s rational for me to precommit to stepping down after a certain time.)
So upon reflection this is a valid concern to the extent that 1) we don’t trust ourselves to implement our current CEV better than our successors and 2) we don’t trust our precommitment mechanism to work either. Of course “our” CEVs probably vary enough that there’s not a single useful answer here.
Indeed, one recurring problem is that we are who we are and not who we want to be. It’s easier to get Our Hypothetical Racist Grandparents to agree that the premises of racism are wrong but it will be harder to get them not to be upset by at the thought of their granddaughter marrying one, even if they know they shouldn’t be and actually do want to change.
Maybe someday we’ll invent brainwashing that works?