Turing computability is not much of an issue for me. It amounts to asking whether the state transitions in an entity can be abstractly mimicked by the state transitions in a Turing machine. For everything in your list, the answer ought to be, yes it can.
However, that is a very limited and abstract resemblance. You could represent the mood of a person, changing across time, with a binary string. But to say that their sequence of moods is a binary string is descriptive rather than definitional.
It sounds like you do want to reduce all mental or conscious phenomena to strictly computational properties. Not just to say that the mind has certain computational properties, but that it has nothing but such properties; that the very definition of a mind is the possession of certain computational properties or capacities.
To do this, first you will need to provide an objective criterion for the attribution of computational properties, such as states. You can chop up a physical state space in many ways, so as to define “high-level” states; which such clustering of physical states, out of all the possibilities, is the one that you will use, and why? Then, you may need to explain what is computational about these states. If you want to say that they have representational content, for example, you will need to say what they are representing and on what basis you attribute this meaning to them. And finally, if you also wish to say that sensory qualities like colors are nothing but computational properties, you will need to say which computational properties, and something about why they “feel” that way.
All of this assumes that you agree that color and meaning do exist in experience. If they are there, they need to be explained. If they do not need to be explained, it can only be because they are not there.
So your position is that there’s no problem accounting for everything we observe in human behaviour, including behaviour like saying “where does subjective experience come from?”, with a physics much like standard physics; but to account for the actual subjective experience itself we need a new physics? That current physics leaves us with a world of what I term M-zombies, who talk about subjective experience but don’t have any?
By life I assume you mean replicators.
Turing computability is not much of an issue for me. It amounts to asking whether the state transitions in an entity can be abstractly mimicked by the state transitions in a Turing machine. For everything in your list, the answer ought to be, yes it can.
However, that is a very limited and abstract resemblance. You could represent the mood of a person, changing across time, with a binary string. But to say that their sequence of moods is a binary string is descriptive rather than definitional.
It sounds like you do want to reduce all mental or conscious phenomena to strictly computational properties. Not just to say that the mind has certain computational properties, but that it has nothing but such properties; that the very definition of a mind is the possession of certain computational properties or capacities.
To do this, first you will need to provide an objective criterion for the attribution of computational properties, such as states. You can chop up a physical state space in many ways, so as to define “high-level” states; which such clustering of physical states, out of all the possibilities, is the one that you will use, and why? Then, you may need to explain what is computational about these states. If you want to say that they have representational content, for example, you will need to say what they are representing and on what basis you attribute this meaning to them. And finally, if you also wish to say that sensory qualities like colors are nothing but computational properties, you will need to say which computational properties, and something about why they “feel” that way.
All of this assumes that you agree that color and meaning do exist in experience. If they are there, they need to be explained. If they do not need to be explained, it can only be because they are not there.
So your position is that there’s no problem accounting for everything we observe in human behaviour, including behaviour like saying “where does subjective experience come from?”, with a physics much like standard physics; but to account for the actual subjective experience itself we need a new physics? That current physics leaves us with a world of what I term M-zombies, who talk about subjective experience but don’t have any?