The problem with the analogy is that we know a whole lot about numbers—math is an artificial language which we created and decided upon the axioms of. How do you know enough about matter and neurons to know that it relates to consciousness in the way that adding positive numbers relates to negative numbers or apples? But I’ve made this point before.
What I would find more interesting is an explanation of what magic would do here. It seems obvious that our perception of a homogenous shade of pink is, in some significant way, related to lightwave frequencies, retinas, and neurons. Let’s assume there is some “magic” involved that in turn converts this physical phenomena into an experience. Wouldn’t it have to interact with neurons and such, so that it generates an experience of pink and not an experience of strawberry-rhubarb pie? If it’s epiphenomenal, how could it accomplish this, and how could it be meaningful? If it’s not epiphenomenal, how does it interact with actual matter? Why can’t we detect it?
It’s quite clear that when it comes to how consciousness works, the current best answer is, “We don’t get it, but it has something to do with the brain and neurons.” Answering, “We don’t get it, but it has something to do with the brain and neurons and magic” appears to be an inferior answer.
This may be a cheap shot around these parts, but the non-materialist position feels a lot like an argument for the existence of God.
It’s quite clear that when it comes to how consciousness works, the current best answer is, “We don’t get it, but it has something to do with the brain and neurons.” Answering, “We don’t get it, but it has something to do with the brain and neurons and magic” appears to be an inferior answer.
This is perfect and I’m not sure there is much more to say.
How do you know enough about matter and neurons to know that it relates to consciousness in the way that adding positive numbers relates to negative numbers or apples?
It’s our theories of matter which are the problem—and which are clear enough for me to say that something is missing. My position as stated here actually is an identity theory. Experiences are a part of the brain and are causally relevant. But the ontology of physics is wrong, and the attempted reduction of phenomenology to that ontology is also wrong. Instead, phenomenology is giving us a glimpse of the true ontology. All that we see directly is the inner ontology of the conscious experience itself, but one supposes that there is some relationship to the ontology of everything else.
The problem with the analogy is that we know a whole lot about numbers—math is an artificial language which we created and decided upon the axioms of. How do you know enough about matter and neurons to know that it relates to consciousness in the way that adding positive numbers relates to negative numbers or apples? But I’ve made this point before.
What I would find more interesting is an explanation of what magic would do here. It seems obvious that our perception of a homogenous shade of pink is, in some significant way, related to lightwave frequencies, retinas, and neurons. Let’s assume there is some “magic” involved that in turn converts this physical phenomena into an experience. Wouldn’t it have to interact with neurons and such, so that it generates an experience of pink and not an experience of strawberry-rhubarb pie? If it’s epiphenomenal, how could it accomplish this, and how could it be meaningful? If it’s not epiphenomenal, how does it interact with actual matter? Why can’t we detect it?
It’s quite clear that when it comes to how consciousness works, the current best answer is, “We don’t get it, but it has something to do with the brain and neurons.” Answering, “We don’t get it, but it has something to do with the brain and neurons and magic” appears to be an inferior answer.
This may be a cheap shot around these parts, but the non-materialist position feels a lot like an argument for the existence of God.
This is perfect and I’m not sure there is much more to say.
It’s our theories of matter which are the problem—and which are clear enough for me to say that something is missing. My position as stated here actually is an identity theory. Experiences are a part of the brain and are causally relevant. But the ontology of physics is wrong, and the attempted reduction of phenomenology to that ontology is also wrong. Instead, phenomenology is giving us a glimpse of the true ontology. All that we see directly is the inner ontology of the conscious experience itself, but one supposes that there is some relationship to the ontology of everything else.