And on the other hand we have a huge amount of dead people, mysteriously killed by bullets that, somehow, got fired in spite of the noted reluctance of men to do so.
Let’s not overstate your case, shall we? No ‘somehow’ about it, even if 90% of soldiers didn’t want to shoot, the remaining 10% could kill a hell of a lot of people; that is the point of guns and explosives, after all—they make killing people quick and easy compared to nagging them to death.
(Where is the precise model relating known mortality rates to number of soldiers shooting, such that Marshall’s claims could have been rejected on their face solely because they conflicted with mortality rates? There is none. The majority of soldiers survive wars, after all.)
the remaining 10% could kill a hell of a lot of people
With modern automatic weapons, if their targets obligingly massed in a single spot, sure. Bolt-action rifles, less so; Civil-War-era muzzle loaders, still less.
Now, there’s a more subtle version of the argument that could be made: Maybe a lot of people were shooting to miss. That would account for the 10000-to-1 bullets-to-hits ratio, also known as “fire your weight in lead to kill a man”. But again, if people weren’t actually shooting, you’d think their officers would notice that they never needed ammunition refills.
Observe: The more people refuse to fire their rifles, the higher should be the proportion of casualties from artillery. Yet from WWII to Vietnam, we see that reports claim an increasing percentage of soldiers firing rifles, but a decreasing proportion of casualties from small arms. I propose that, instead, the proportion of rifle-firers was constant and the lethality and ubiquity of artillery was growing. Note that, to make up for an increase from 25% to 55% of rifle-firers, as is claimed from WWII to Vietnam, artillery would have to become twice as deadly just to remain on an even footing; this seems to me unlikely, even though there certainly were technical advances.
With modern automatic weapons, if their targets obligingly massed in a single spot, sure. Bolt-action rifles, less so; Civil-War-era muzzle loaders, still less.
So, do you know offhand exactly how many soldiers were killed by other soldiers in all those conflicts? Do you know how fast and effective those weapons were? Do you know what the distribution and skew of killings per soldier are and how that changes from conflict to conflict? You do not know any of those factors, all of which together determine whether the Marshall estimate is plausible.
‘Marshall made everything up’ is a good argument. ‘Look, there’s lots of dead soldiers!’ is a terrible argument which is pure rhetoric.
Note that, to make up for an increase from 25% to 55% of rifle-firers, as is claimed from WWII to Vietnam, artillery would have to become twice as deadly just to remain on an even footing; this seems to me unlikely, even though there certainly were technical advances.
Ceteris is never paribus. You’re just digging yourself in deeper. Those conflicts were completely different—WWII and Vietnam, seriously? You can’t think of any reasons artillery might have different results in them?
Let’s not overstate your case, shall we? No ‘somehow’ about it, even if 90% of soldiers didn’t want to shoot, the remaining 10% could kill a hell of a lot of people; that is the point of guns and explosives, after all—they make killing people quick and easy compared to nagging them to death.
(Where is the precise model relating known mortality rates to number of soldiers shooting, such that Marshall’s claims could have been rejected on their face solely because they conflicted with mortality rates? There is none. The majority of soldiers survive wars, after all.)
With modern automatic weapons, if their targets obligingly massed in a single spot, sure. Bolt-action rifles, less so; Civil-War-era muzzle loaders, still less.
Now, there’s a more subtle version of the argument that could be made: Maybe a lot of people were shooting to miss. That would account for the 10000-to-1 bullets-to-hits ratio, also known as “fire your weight in lead to kill a man”. But again, if people weren’t actually shooting, you’d think their officers would notice that they never needed ammunition refills.
Observe: The more people refuse to fire their rifles, the higher should be the proportion of casualties from artillery. Yet from WWII to Vietnam, we see that reports claim an increasing percentage of soldiers firing rifles, but a decreasing proportion of casualties from small arms. I propose that, instead, the proportion of rifle-firers was constant and the lethality and ubiquity of artillery was growing. Note that, to make up for an increase from 25% to 55% of rifle-firers, as is claimed from WWII to Vietnam, artillery would have to become twice as deadly just to remain on an even footing; this seems to me unlikely, even though there certainly were technical advances.
So, do you know offhand exactly how many soldiers were killed by other soldiers in all those conflicts? Do you know how fast and effective those weapons were? Do you know what the distribution and skew of killings per soldier are and how that changes from conflict to conflict? You do not know any of those factors, all of which together determine whether the Marshall estimate is plausible.
‘Marshall made everything up’ is a good argument. ‘Look, there’s lots of dead soldiers!’ is a terrible argument which is pure rhetoric.
Ceteris is never paribus. You’re just digging yourself in deeper. Those conflicts were completely different—WWII and Vietnam, seriously? You can’t think of any reasons artillery might have different results in them?
Ok, I sit corrected.