The marshmallow and Asch experiments aren’t testing anything like intellectual lability. They are testing if you can do the reasonable thing despite emotions and biases. That’s a big part of rationality and that’s what I’d like to test. Reasoning yourself out of religion is an advanced use of the same skill.
The marshmallow experiment tests several things, among them the time preference. Asch tests, also among other things, how much do you value fitting well into society. It’s not all that simple.
testing the ability to do the reasonable thing despite emotions and biases
May I then suggest calling this ability “vulcanness” and measure it in millispocks?
And how that “ability to do the reasonable thing” is going to be orthogonal to intelligence?
When asked about their preferences verbally, most people wouldn’t endorse the extreme time discounting that would justify eating the marshmallow right away, and wouldn’t endorse killing a test subject to please the experimenter. So I don’t think these behaviors can be viewed as rational.
You are aware of the difference between expressed preferences and revealed preferences, yes? It doesn’t seem to me that sticking with expressed preferences has much to do with rationality.
I prefer to work under the assumption that some human actions are irrational, not just revealed preferences. Mostly because “revealed preferences” feels like a curiosity stopper, and researching specific kinds of irrationality (biases) is so fruitful in comparison.
I prefer to work under the assumption that some human actions are irrational, not just revealed preferences.
Huh? Both expressed and revealed preferences might or might not be rational. There’s nothing about revealed preferences which makes them irrational by default.
feels like a curiosity stopper
Nobody’s telling you to stop there. Asking, for example, “why does this person have these preferences and is there a reason they are not explicit?” allows you to continue.
The marshmallow and Asch experiments aren’t testing anything like intellectual lability. They are testing if you can do the reasonable thing despite emotions and biases. That’s a big part of rationality and that’s what I’d like to test. Reasoning yourself out of religion is an advanced use of the same skill.
The marshmallow experiment tests several things, among them the time preference. Asch tests, also among other things, how much do you value fitting well into society. It’s not all that simple.
May I then suggest calling this ability “vulcanness” and measure it in millispocks?
And how that “ability to do the reasonable thing” is going to be orthogonal to intelligence?
When asked about their preferences verbally, most people wouldn’t endorse the extreme time discounting that would justify eating the marshmallow right away, and wouldn’t endorse killing a test subject to please the experimenter. So I don’t think these behaviors can be viewed as rational.
You are aware of the difference between expressed preferences and revealed preferences, yes? It doesn’t seem to me that sticking with expressed preferences has much to do with rationality.
I prefer to work under the assumption that some human actions are irrational, not just revealed preferences. Mostly because “revealed preferences” feels like a curiosity stopper, and researching specific kinds of irrationality (biases) is so fruitful in comparison.
Huh? Both expressed and revealed preferences might or might not be rational. There’s nothing about revealed preferences which makes them irrational by default.
Nobody’s telling you to stop there. Asking, for example, “why does this person have these preferences and is there a reason they are not explicit?” allows you to continue.