However, true, conscious implementations of me can only exist on real hardware that exists in our universe.
I was expecting #9 to contradict this, but it doesn’t, really. Are the words “simulation” and “superintelligence” meant to only refer to objects in the “real world” (whatever that is)? I would suggest that the level above #9 is
10. Any implementation of me is me, regardless of whether or not it “exists” in the “real world”. In particular, any mathematical object that implements me is me. For example, if the laws of physics can be perfectly described by a set of equations, then I am the same thing as the mathematical object that would be used to represent me. Note that it follows from this that there are versions of me that are about to have any possible experience, regardless of whether our own laws of physics + initial conditions allow Boltzmann brains (since there is a mathematically consistent physics + initial conditions that does allow them).
That’s fair; I wasn’t sure how to phrase the idea in 8 to exclude 9, so the language isn’t perfect, and I agree, now that I’ve seen it, that your proposed 10 is conceptually a step above my 9. Let me know if it is okay for me to add your 10 to my list.
Out of curiosity, do you consider the 10 you wrote “intuitively true”, or just the logical next step in a hypothetical ladder?
You can add my #10 to your list. Regarding your new #8, I’m not sure I understand the distinction between a brain implemented on a computer chip vs a simulation of a brain. Regarding my opinion on what is “intuitively true”, it seems like all of them are different ways of making more precise the notion of identity, I don’t know that it makes sense to give one of them a privileged status. In other words they all seem to be referring to slightly different concepts, all of which appear to be valid...
When you wrote
I was expecting #9 to contradict this, but it doesn’t, really. Are the words “simulation” and “superintelligence” meant to only refer to objects in the “real world” (whatever that is)? I would suggest that the level above #9 is
10. Any implementation of me is me, regardless of whether or not it “exists” in the “real world”. In particular, any mathematical object that implements me is me. For example, if the laws of physics can be perfectly described by a set of equations, then I am the same thing as the mathematical object that would be used to represent me. Note that it follows from this that there are versions of me that are about to have any possible experience, regardless of whether our own laws of physics + initial conditions allow Boltzmann brains (since there is a mathematically consistent physics + initial conditions that does allow them).
That’s fair; I wasn’t sure how to phrase the idea in 8 to exclude 9, so the language isn’t perfect, and I agree, now that I’ve seen it, that your proposed 10 is conceptually a step above my 9. Let me know if it is okay for me to add your 10 to my list.
Out of curiosity, do you consider the 10 you wrote “intuitively true”, or just the logical next step in a hypothetical ladder?
Edit: I did my best to fix 8.
You can add my #10 to your list. Regarding your new #8, I’m not sure I understand the distinction between a brain implemented on a computer chip vs a simulation of a brain. Regarding my opinion on what is “intuitively true”, it seems like all of them are different ways of making more precise the notion of identity, I don’t know that it makes sense to give one of them a privileged status. In other words they all seem to be referring to slightly different concepts, all of which appear to be valid...