do you really require a theory to have no problems remaining in order for it to be counted as insightful?
It would be one thing if Kelly said that the theory currently can’t predict that another particle will come in 10 seconds, but he hopes to eventually extend it so that it can make predictions like that. But instead he says that Ockham is mute on the question, and that’s the right answer.
No one else addresses the question “Where does the prior come from?”.
Neither does Kelly. I don’t see how we can go from his idea of Ockham to a Bayesian prior, or how to use it directly in decision making. Kelly’s position above suggests that he doesn’t consider this to be the problem that he’s trying to solve. (And I don’t see what is so interesting about the problem that he is trying to solve.)
Okay, I think we’ve reached a point of reflective disagreement.
I agree with you that Kelly was wrong to be enamored of his formalization’s output on the timed particles example; it’s either a regrettable flaw that must be lived with, or a regrettable flaw that we should try to fix, and I don’t understand enough of the topological math to tell which.
However, the unjustified Occam prior in the standard Bayesian account of science is also a regrettable flaw—and Kelly has demonstrated that it’s probably fixable. I find that very intriguing, and am willing to put some time into understanding Kelly’s approach—even if it dissolves something that I previously cherished (such as MDL-based Occam priors).
Reasonable people can reasonably disagree regarding which research avenues are likely to be valuable.
It would be one thing if Kelly said that the theory currently can’t predict that another particle will come in 10 seconds, but he hopes to eventually extend it so that it can make predictions like that. But instead he says that Ockham is mute on the question, and that’s the right answer.
Neither does Kelly. I don’t see how we can go from his idea of Ockham to a Bayesian prior, or how to use it directly in decision making. Kelly’s position above suggests that he doesn’t consider this to be the problem that he’s trying to solve. (And I don’t see what is so interesting about the problem that he is trying to solve.)
Okay, I think we’ve reached a point of reflective disagreement.
I agree with you that Kelly was wrong to be enamored of his formalization’s output on the timed particles example; it’s either a regrettable flaw that must be lived with, or a regrettable flaw that we should try to fix, and I don’t understand enough of the topological math to tell which.
However, the unjustified Occam prior in the standard Bayesian account of science is also a regrettable flaw—and Kelly has demonstrated that it’s probably fixable. I find that very intriguing, and am willing to put some time into understanding Kelly’s approach—even if it dissolves something that I previously cherished (such as MDL-based Occam priors).
Reasonable people can reasonably disagree regarding which research avenues are likely to be valuable.