the “meaning”, insofar as it involves “referring” to something, depends on stuff outside the mind of the speaker. That may seem obvious in retrospect, but it’s pretty tempting to think otherwise
The idea produces non-obvious results if you apply it to, for example, mathematical concepts. They certainly refer to something, which is therefore outside the mind. Conclusion: Hylaean Theoric World.
Being convinced by Putnam on this front doesn’t mean that you have to think that everything refers! There are plenty of accounts of what’s going on with mathematics that don’t have mathematical terms referring to floaty mathematical entities. Besides, Putnam’s point isn’t that the referent of a term is going to be outside your head; that’s pretty uncontroversial, as long as you think we’re talking about something outside your head. What he argues is that this means that the meaning of a term depends on stuff outside your head, which is a bit different.
There are plenty of accounts of what’s going on with mathematics that don’t have mathematical terms referring to floaty mathematical entities
Could you list the one(s) that you find convincing? (even if this is somewhat off-topic in this thread...)
What he argues is that this means that the meaning of a term depends on stuff outside your head, which is a bit different
That is, IIUC, the “meaning” of a concept is not completely defined by its place within the mind’s conceptual structure. This seems correct, as the “meaning” is supposed to be about the correspondence between the map and the territory, an not about some topological property of the map.
Have a look here for a reasonable overview of philosophy of maths. Any kind of formalism or nominalism won’t have floaty mathematical entities—in the former case you’re talking about concrete symbols, and in the latter case about the physical world in some way (these are broad categories, so I’m being vague).
Personally, I think a kind of logical modal structuralism is on the right track. That would claim that when you make a mathematical statement, you’re really saying: “It is a necessary logical truth that any system which satisfied my axioms would also satisfy this conclusion.”
So if you say “2+2 = 4”, you’re actually saying that if there were a system that behaved like the natural numbers (which is logically possible, so long as the axioms are consistent), then in that system two plus two would equal four.
See Hellman’s “Mathematics Without Numbers” for the classic defense of this kind of position.
Thanks for the answer! But I am still confused regarding the ontological status of “2” under many of the philosophical positions. Or, better yet, the ontological status of the real numbers field R. Formalism and platonism are easy: under formalism, R is a symbol that has no referent. Under platonism, R exists in the HTW. If I understand your preferred position correctly, it says: “any system that satisfies axioms of R also satisfies the various theorems about it”. But, assuming the universe is finite or discrete, there is no physical system that satisfies axioms of R. Does it mean your position reduces to formalism then?
There’s no actual system that satisfies the axioms of the reals, but there (logically) could be. If you like, you could say that there is a “possible system” that satisfies those axioms (as long as they’re not contradictory!).
The real answer is that talk of numbers as entities can be thought of as syntactic sugar for saying that certain logical implications hold. It’s somewhat revisionary, in that that’s not what people think that they are doing, and people talked about numbers long before they knew of any axiomatizations for them, but if you think about it it’s pretty clear why those ways of talking would have worked, even if people hadn’t quite figured out the right way to think about it yet.
If you like, you can think of it as saying: “Numbers don’t exist as floaty entities, so strictly speaking normal number talk is all wrong. However, [facts about logical implications] are true, and there’s a pretty clear truth-preserving mapping between the two, so perhaps this is what people were trying to get at.”
Seems to me that you can dodge the Platonic implications (that Anathem was riffing on). You can talk about relations between objects, which depend on objects outside the mind of the speaker but have no independent physical existence in themselves; you need not only a shared referent but also some shared inference, but that’s still quite achievable without needing to invoke some Form of, say, mathematical associativeness.
The idea produces non-obvious results if you apply it to, for example, mathematical concepts. They certainly refer to something, which is therefore outside the mind. Conclusion: Hylaean Theoric World.
Being convinced by Putnam on this front doesn’t mean that you have to think that everything refers! There are plenty of accounts of what’s going on with mathematics that don’t have mathematical terms referring to floaty mathematical entities. Besides, Putnam’s point isn’t that the referent of a term is going to be outside your head; that’s pretty uncontroversial, as long as you think we’re talking about something outside your head. What he argues is that this means that the meaning of a term depends on stuff outside your head, which is a bit different.
Could you list the one(s) that you find convincing? (even if this is somewhat off-topic in this thread...)
That is, IIUC, the “meaning” of a concept is not completely defined by its place within the mind’s conceptual structure. This seems correct, as the “meaning” is supposed to be about the correspondence between the map and the territory, an not about some topological property of the map.
Have a look here for a reasonable overview of philosophy of maths. Any kind of formalism or nominalism won’t have floaty mathematical entities—in the former case you’re talking about concrete symbols, and in the latter case about the physical world in some way (these are broad categories, so I’m being vague).
Personally, I think a kind of logical modal structuralism is on the right track. That would claim that when you make a mathematical statement, you’re really saying: “It is a necessary logical truth that any system which satisfied my axioms would also satisfy this conclusion.”
So if you say “2+2 = 4”, you’re actually saying that if there were a system that behaved like the natural numbers (which is logically possible, so long as the axioms are consistent), then in that system two plus two would equal four.
See Hellman’s “Mathematics Without Numbers” for the classic defense of this kind of position.
Thanks for the answer! But I am still confused regarding the ontological status of “2” under many of the philosophical positions. Or, better yet, the ontological status of the real numbers field R. Formalism and platonism are easy: under formalism, R is a symbol that has no referent. Under platonism, R exists in the HTW. If I understand your preferred position correctly, it says: “any system that satisfies axioms of R also satisfies the various theorems about it”. But, assuming the universe is finite or discrete, there is no physical system that satisfies axioms of R. Does it mean your position reduces to formalism then?
There’s no actual system that satisfies the axioms of the reals, but there (logically) could be. If you like, you could say that there is a “possible system” that satisfies those axioms (as long as they’re not contradictory!).
The real answer is that talk of numbers as entities can be thought of as syntactic sugar for saying that certain logical implications hold. It’s somewhat revisionary, in that that’s not what people think that they are doing, and people talked about numbers long before they knew of any axiomatizations for them, but if you think about it it’s pretty clear why those ways of talking would have worked, even if people hadn’t quite figured out the right way to think about it yet.
If you like, you can think of it as saying: “Numbers don’t exist as floaty entities, so strictly speaking normal number talk is all wrong. However, [facts about logical implications] are true, and there’s a pretty clear truth-preserving mapping between the two, so perhaps this is what people were trying to get at.”
Seems to me that you can dodge the Platonic implications (that Anathem was riffing on). You can talk about relations between objects, which depend on objects outside the mind of the speaker but have no independent physical existence in themselves; you need not only a shared referent but also some shared inference, but that’s still quite achievable without needing to invoke some Form of, say, mathematical associativeness.