Right. It’s very useful to clear up conceptual confusions. That’s much of what The Sequences can teach people. What’s wrong is the claim that attempts to clear up conceptual confusions couldn’t conflict with science.
Hm. Perhaps you’re right. Maybe I should have said that it shouldn’t ever conflict with science. But I think that’s because if you’re coming into conflict with science you’re doing your philosophy wrong, more than anything else.
Hmm. I guess I agree with that. That is, dominant scientific theories can be conceptually confused and need correction.
But would 20th century analytic philosophy have denied that? The opposite seems to me to be true. Analytic philosophers would justify their intrusions into the sciences by arguing that they were applying their philosophical acumen to identify conceptual confusions that the scientists hadn’t noticed. (I’m thinking of Jerry Fodor’s recent critique of the explanatory power of Darwinian natural selection, for example—though that’s from our own century.)
Just to be clear, I think that analytic philosophers often should have been more humble when they barged in and started telling scientist how confused they were. Fodor’s critique of NS would again be my go-to example of that.
Dennett states this point in typically strong terms in his review of Fodor’s argument:
I cannot forebear noting, on a rather more serious note, that such ostentatiously unresearched ridicule as Fodor heaps on Darwinians here is both very rude and very risky to one’s reputation. (Remember Mary Midgley’s notoriously ignorant and arrogant review of The Selfish Gene? Fodor is vying to supplant her as World Champion in the Philosophers’ Self- inflicted Wound Competition.) Before other philosophers countenance it they might want to bear in mind that the reaction of most biologists to this sort of performance is apt to be–at best: “Well, we needn’t bother paying any attention to him. He’s just one of those philosophers playing games with words.” It may be fun, but it contributes to the disrespect that many non- philosophers have for our so-called discipline.
Right. It’s very useful to clear up conceptual confusions. That’s much of what The Sequences can teach people. What’s wrong is the claim that attempts to clear up conceptual confusions couldn’t conflict with science.
Hm. Perhaps you’re right. Maybe I should have said that it shouldn’t ever conflict with science. But I think that’s because if you’re coming into conflict with science you’re doing your philosophy wrong, more than anything else.
Would you mind adding this clarification to your original comment above that was upvoted 22 times? :)
Sure; it is indeed ambiguous ;)
Hmm. I guess I agree with that. That is, dominant scientific theories can be conceptually confused and need correction.
But would 20th century analytic philosophy have denied that? The opposite seems to me to be true. Analytic philosophers would justify their intrusions into the sciences by arguing that they were applying their philosophical acumen to identify conceptual confusions that the scientists hadn’t noticed. (I’m thinking of Jerry Fodor’s recent critique of the explanatory power of Darwinian natural selection, for example—though that’s from our own century.)
No, I don’t think the better half of 20th century analytic philosophers would have denied that.
Just to be clear, I think that analytic philosophers often should have been more humble when they barged in and started telling scientist how confused they were. Fodor’s critique of NS would again be my go-to example of that.
Dennett states this point in typically strong terms in his review of Fodor’s argument:
I