I mean, yes, but having that preference gives them no special advantage relative to not having it.
But of course it does! It grants them a reason to seek to have the preference satisfied, which is an advantage if (a) having the preference satisfied is a sufficiently superior state to not having the preference at all, and (b) conditional on having the preference, satisfaction is sufficiently likely.
(Basically all of this is explained in the previously-linked Vladimir_M comments, so I do encourage you to reread them if you haven’t done so.)
Suppose that I have a gluten intolerance and need to have gluten-free food available. It’s of course true that getting to have gluten-free food is now a distinct advantage to me, compared to a scenario where I couldn’t get gluten-free food. But the fact that I have a gluten intolerance doesn’t make me better off overall. If I get accommodated, then at best I get to the same neutral level of “can eat food without getting terrible symptoms” that everyone else is at. And more realistically, I won’t even get to that zero level but rather will sometimes accidentally eat food with gluten, will miss out on tasty foods I’d enjoy, etc., so it’d be better for me to not have the intolerance.
On the contrary, it is not only plausible but very easy to end up in a superior end state in this scenario. Suppose that having gluten-free food provided for you is costly and difficult, and that you can convince or otherwise cause others to expend their resources on providing you with gluten-free food. This is a signal of your social status, clearly visible to anyone who observes such behavioral interactions. And, in turn, there are many, many situations when an even relatively small advantage in social status is more important (by any relevant measure) than an even quite substantial loss in sensory pleasure from food. (I trust that no examples are needed to illustrate this general point.)
In such a case, it would indeed be better for you to have the gluten intolerance than not to have it.
Note that this logic predicts that we should see people who don’t actually have gluten intolerance, to pretend to do so (as any status signal will attract imitators/fakers). And indeed this is precisely what we do see.
Likewise, if someone gets terribly upset about being told “you’re wrong”, then if that’s accommodated, at best they get to the same zero level as everyone who doesn’t get terribly upset about it. And it’s more likely that they won’t get perfectly accommodated, so not only will they gain nothing, but will also need to endure discomfort they wouldn’t need to endure if they didn’t have that sensitivity. So if they don’t already have that pre-existing sensitivity, there’s no incentive for them to develop it.
The above logic applies here too. (And this is definitely, and very comprehensively, treated in the linked discussion thread…)
I do not think that this is the least bit warranted.
Why not? I know plenty of otherwise intelligent, creative etc. people who also have serious mental health problems.
That is not the correct question. The correct question is whether, on average, such people are equally good students to people without such serious mental problems (“such”, note; mental health problems, serious or no, are not monolithic, nor uniform in their effects on academic performance), or better, or worse. (And remember that we are not comparing to general population averages here, but to the population subsets selected for going to college!)
For your assumption to be warranted, it would have to be the case that someone who has a mental breakdown when told that they’re wrong would, if accommodated for that particular disability, be about as good a student on average as… well, the average student. This is highly implausible. (For one thing, remember that mental disorders are highly correlated with one another!)
But of course it does! It grants them a reason to seek to have the preference satisfied, which is an advantage if (a) having the preference satisfied is a sufficiently superior state to not having the preference at all, and (b) conditional on having the preference, satisfaction is sufficiently likely.
(Basically all of this is explained in the previously-linked Vladimir_M comments, so I do encourage you to reread them if you haven’t done so.)
On the contrary, it is not only plausible but very easy to end up in a superior end state in this scenario. Suppose that having gluten-free food provided for you is costly and difficult, and that you can convince or otherwise cause others to expend their resources on providing you with gluten-free food. This is a signal of your social status, clearly visible to anyone who observes such behavioral interactions. And, in turn, there are many, many situations when an even relatively small advantage in social status is more important (by any relevant measure) than an even quite substantial loss in sensory pleasure from food. (I trust that no examples are needed to illustrate this general point.)
In such a case, it would indeed be better for you to have the gluten intolerance than not to have it.
Note that this logic predicts that we should see people who don’t actually have gluten intolerance, to pretend to do so (as any status signal will attract imitators/fakers). And indeed this is precisely what we do see.
The above logic applies here too. (And this is definitely, and very comprehensively, treated in the linked discussion thread…)
That is not the correct question. The correct question is whether, on average, such people are equally good students to people without such serious mental problems (“such”, note; mental health problems, serious or no, are not monolithic, nor uniform in their effects on academic performance), or better, or worse. (And remember that we are not comparing to general population averages here, but to the population subsets selected for going to college!)
For your assumption to be warranted, it would have to be the case that someone who has a mental breakdown when told that they’re wrong would, if accommodated for that particular disability, be about as good a student on average as… well, the average student. This is highly implausible. (For one thing, remember that mental disorders are highly correlated with one another!)