So you’re arguing that it’s not rational, under the assumption of common rationality, to play the unique Nash equilibrium?
Is making an “assumption of common rationality” really a rational choice, even here?
With the stakes as low as this, I would assign a very high likelihood to someone getting greater utility from throwing a spanner in the works for the lulz than from a serious attempt at winning, even if at least one such person hadn’t already announced their action.
Is making an “assumption of common rationality” really a rational choice, even here?
FWIW, I never suggested it was. Lavalamp claimed that zero was not rational under the assumptions in the OP’s original justification, one of which was common rationality. It was the validity of that argument I was defending; not it’s soundness.
Is making an “assumption of common rationality” really a rational choice, even here?
With the stakes as low as this, I would assign a very high likelihood to someone getting greater utility from throwing a spanner in the works for the lulz than from a serious attempt at winning, even if at least one such person hadn’t already announced their action.
FWIW, I never suggested it was. Lavalamp claimed that zero was not rational under the assumptions in the OP’s original justification, one of which was common rationality. It was the validity of that argument I was defending; not it’s soundness.