Unless you are positing strict determinism, or full timeless physics, or literal “there is no territory,” a causing b just means a is either a necessary, sufficient, or both condition for b. Define a and b at whatever level you want to call the “territory.”
My point here is epistemological, not physical or metaphysical. I need not posit anything be true about the territory, only that I can say nothing about it without imposing some map, model, categories, etc.. The moment we define something at any level we’ve left the territory for the map.
Or not. There’s a metaphor where concepts and categories are something you see instead of the territory, ie. the veil of perception, but there’s also a metaphor where concepts and categories are a lens through which one sees the territory. Making an arbitrary choice of metaphor doesnt prove anything.
So for this we do have some pretty good evidence, namely the process of observation and perception appears to be a physical one, i.e. we have no evidence that anything can be perceived directly just as it is, and in fact we’d expect the world to look different if we could, such as there being a lack of arguments about the boundaries of categories.
For what? For which of the three or four views you have been putting forward?
Science gives us good evidence against naive realism, but theproblem is that there is more than one alternative to naive realism. So, further arguments are needed to support a specific alternative to naive realism.
So, what is the difference between that episiotomy (all communication describes a map) and mine (some communication describes the territory)?
Like: on what kinds of questions would they lead to different answers? Is one of them faster, or less likely to lead to errors? Is there some other distinction in effect that I just can’t conceive?
Neither, the descriptions you give are both partial, and both are true and not in conflict. I think the only issue perhaps is thinking that “all communication describes a map” is the sum total of what I’m saying here.
My constructions are, by definition, in conflict (if you assume map != territory, which is a question of definitions. Let me know if you are using those words differently).
How does your thesis differ from “all communication describes a map”?
Where is the conflict? It can be both true that, for example, a cup is a thing reified in the map and there is some aspect of the territory that cup predicts, at least based on how it affects a map.
Of course you want a map that describes the territory, but that does not mean the same thing as ontology = metaphysics.
Can you give an example of describing the territory that does not include reification?
I would accept “the indented torus collection of covalent bonded atoms at approximately [1′ x 2 ′ x 2 ′ with my brain as the origin point] emits electromagnetic radiation primarily in the 650-680 nm range” (ie “That cup is red”), but I suspect that you would not.
So, what is the difference between that episiotomy (anything you can say draws a map) and mine (some communication describes the territory)? Like: on what kinds of questions would they lead to different answers? Is one of them faster, or less likely to lead to errors? Is there some other distinction in effect that I just can’t conceive?
Um, you literally just said two posts up that you can’t say anything that does not involve drawing a map. That you are defining “the territory” to be out of reach of mere words.
I’m asserting that “the territory” should be defined to be at the limit of what words can describe, but still within bounds. I’m literally saying “take your meta-map of how maps & territory work, and move one inferential step towards the position “there is no map, it’s all territory.”″
It sounds like you’re begging the question here.
Unless you are positing strict determinism, or full timeless physics, or literal “there is no territory,” a causing b just means a is either a necessary, sufficient, or both condition for b. Define a and b at whatever level you want to call the “territory.”
My point here is epistemological, not physical or metaphysical. I need not posit anything be true about the territory, only that I can say nothing about it without imposing some map, model, categories, etc.. The moment we define something at any level we’ve left the territory for the map.
Or not. There’s a metaphor where concepts and categories are something you see instead of the territory, ie. the veil of perception, but there’s also a metaphor where concepts and categories are a lens through which one sees the territory. Making an arbitrary choice of metaphor doesnt prove anything.
So for this we do have some pretty good evidence, namely the process of observation and perception appears to be a physical one, i.e. we have no evidence that anything can be perceived directly just as it is, and in fact we’d expect the world to look different if we could, such as there being a lack of arguments about the boundaries of categories.
For what? For which of the three or four views you have been putting forward?
Science gives us good evidence against naive realism, but theproblem is that there is more than one alternative to naive realism. So, further arguments are needed to support a specific alternative to naive realism.
I think what you’re seeing here is that there’s multiple aspects to what I’m saying, which look like different views but really aren’t.
Feel free to explain how they come together.
So, what is the difference between that episiotomy (all communication describes a map) and mine (some communication describes the territory)? Like: on what kinds of questions would they lead to different answers? Is one of them faster, or less likely to lead to errors? Is there some other distinction in effect that I just can’t conceive?
Neither, the descriptions you give are both partial, and both are true and not in conflict. I think the only issue perhaps is thinking that “all communication describes a map” is the sum total of what I’m saying here.
My constructions are, by definition, in conflict (if you assume map != territory, which is a question of definitions. Let me know if you are using those words differently). How does your thesis differ from “all communication describes a map”?
Where is the conflict? It can be both true that, for example, a cup is a thing reified in the map and there is some aspect of the territory that cup predicts, at least based on how it affects a map.
Of course you want a map that describes the territory, but that does not mean the same thing as ontology = metaphysics.
Can you give an example of describing the territory that does not include reification? I would accept “the indented torus collection of covalent bonded atoms at approximately [1′ x 2 ′ x 2 ′ with my brain as the origin point] emits electromagnetic radiation primarily in the 650-680 nm range” (ie “That cup is red”), but I suspect that you would not.
I can’t, because that’s impossible. There’s nothing I can say that does not involve drawing a map.
So, what is the difference between that episiotomy (anything you can say draws a map) and mine (some communication describes the territory)? Like: on what kinds of questions would they lead to different answers? Is one of them faster, or less likely to lead to errors? Is there some other distinction in effect that I just can’t conceive?
This question remains confused so I can’t answer it in good faith, because I’ve already rejected its premise above.
Um, you literally just said two posts up that you can’t say anything that does not involve drawing a map. That you are defining “the territory” to be out of reach of mere words.
I’m asserting that “the territory” should be defined to be at the limit of what words can describe, but still within bounds. I’m literally saying “take your meta-map of how maps & territory work, and move one inferential step towards the position “there is no map, it’s all territory.”″
Then, go back and review my previous questions.
“There is no causation in the territory” is a claim about the territory. It cannot be asserted if the territory is unknowable.
You need to distinguish between a number of subtly different claims:
The territory is knowable, and known not to contain certain things (which are nonetheless useful for mapping purposes . (Eg. Nobody has 2.4 children).
The territory is only knowable , “via” human concepts (Kant)
The territory is unknowable, or equivalently correspondence between map and territory is impossible.
Etc.
We need not be so detailed. To make a claim about the territory is to be in the map, and thus the point is already proved.
To be in the map is to be in the territory.