You are saying that there is some monad in my head and that monad is me?
Yes.
I think a concrete example of a quantum-monadological hypothesis is in order. The best-known quantum-mind theories revolve around microtubules, so let’s start there.
Orthodox cognitive neuroscience revolves around synapses and action potentials. But let’s suppose Stuart Hameroff is right and microtubules are relevant as well, and are not just structural molecules. Maybe there are quantum-entangled mobile electrons in the shell of the microtubule, they feel the action potential, and they affect the binding of microtubule-associated proteins, i.e. let’s suppose they are causally relevant to neuronal information processing, as they had better be if they are going to be the locus of consciousness. So, some subpopulation of microtubules, in some subpopulation of neurons, contains a big set of entangled electrons—and that is the monad that is you.
Although I have described it as a “set of entangled electrons”, it is to be regarded as elementary because entangled objects no longer have independent individual states—they are more like aspects of a bigger thing (at least under the interpretation of quantum theory I’m using). Mathematically, it has a large number of degrees of freedom, and I suppose that in reality, those degrees of freedom are busy being your conscious thoughts, perceptions, and so forth.
Does that make things clearer?
I certainly know about David Chalmers’s work and I generally agree with it. I just think we need to go even further and say, not just that “raw sensory qualities” aren’t present in physics as normally conceived, but that they are bound together in consciousness in a way which suggests an underlying ontological unity beyond that possessed by a collection of spatial parts.
Thanks, that is quite a bit clearer. How would a quantum-monadological hypothesis make sense of split-brain cases? Surely the slicing of a corpus callosum can’t divide a monad.
Even given the general hypothesis, most of the brain’s computations are still being done classically and unconsciously, in the form of interactions among small quantum systems (environmentally decohered biomolecules, let’s say). Snipping through a bundle of nerves will interfere with these classical computations and have functional consequences.
But I really have nothing to say about split-brain phenomenology from a quantum perspective. The big biophysical challenge for me is just to explain how you can have significant structured entanglement extending beyond the individual neuron. How might the electrons (say) in one neuron even become entangled with those in another? The quantum-mind literature has suggestions, such as phonons in the polymer fibers of the extracellular matrix.
But I would prefer to first see much more progress in understanding the quantum dynamics of living matter when investigated from a neutral perspective, one that isn’t specifically looking for interneuronal conduits of coherent quantum interaction. We need to know whether proteins spend significant time in superpositions of different conformations, whether the aqueous intracellular environment is entirely thermal or contains any form of quantum order… There needs to be a little more progress in general quantum biology before we can have a well-founded quantum neurobiology.
Mathematically, it has a large number of degrees of freedom, and I suppose that in reality, those degrees of freedom are busy being your conscious thoughts, perceptions, and so forth.
Whoa, how do you get to make the jump to the degrees of freedom being my conscious thoughts? Whenever anyone else does that, you call it a deficient ontology, denying reality of experience, vaguing out, etc. But you’re doing the exact same thing!
You have no standing on which to object to someone saying, “The brain state consistent with a certain wavelength of EM radiation hitting my eyes is my conscious experience of blue.”
I plead guilty to talking in a way which is ambiguous about the relationship between the actual thing and its mathematical description. I am frankly not sure what the right way to do so is. My objection to the similar identity statements that people produce is that they can’t explain how the identity could be true, and will even define away the phenomenon they are supposed to be explaining.
Yes.
I think a concrete example of a quantum-monadological hypothesis is in order. The best-known quantum-mind theories revolve around microtubules, so let’s start there.
Orthodox cognitive neuroscience revolves around synapses and action potentials. But let’s suppose Stuart Hameroff is right and microtubules are relevant as well, and are not just structural molecules. Maybe there are quantum-entangled mobile electrons in the shell of the microtubule, they feel the action potential, and they affect the binding of microtubule-associated proteins, i.e. let’s suppose they are causally relevant to neuronal information processing, as they had better be if they are going to be the locus of consciousness. So, some subpopulation of microtubules, in some subpopulation of neurons, contains a big set of entangled electrons—and that is the monad that is you.
Although I have described it as a “set of entangled electrons”, it is to be regarded as elementary because entangled objects no longer have independent individual states—they are more like aspects of a bigger thing (at least under the interpretation of quantum theory I’m using). Mathematically, it has a large number of degrees of freedom, and I suppose that in reality, those degrees of freedom are busy being your conscious thoughts, perceptions, and so forth.
Does that make things clearer?
I certainly know about David Chalmers’s work and I generally agree with it. I just think we need to go even further and say, not just that “raw sensory qualities” aren’t present in physics as normally conceived, but that they are bound together in consciousness in a way which suggests an underlying ontological unity beyond that possessed by a collection of spatial parts.
Thanks, that is quite a bit clearer. How would a quantum-monadological hypothesis make sense of split-brain cases? Surely the slicing of a corpus callosum can’t divide a monad.
Even given the general hypothesis, most of the brain’s computations are still being done classically and unconsciously, in the form of interactions among small quantum systems (environmentally decohered biomolecules, let’s say). Snipping through a bundle of nerves will interfere with these classical computations and have functional consequences.
But I really have nothing to say about split-brain phenomenology from a quantum perspective. The big biophysical challenge for me is just to explain how you can have significant structured entanglement extending beyond the individual neuron. How might the electrons (say) in one neuron even become entangled with those in another? The quantum-mind literature has suggestions, such as phonons in the polymer fibers of the extracellular matrix.
But I would prefer to first see much more progress in understanding the quantum dynamics of living matter when investigated from a neutral perspective, one that isn’t specifically looking for interneuronal conduits of coherent quantum interaction. We need to know whether proteins spend significant time in superpositions of different conformations, whether the aqueous intracellular environment is entirely thermal or contains any form of quantum order… There needs to be a little more progress in general quantum biology before we can have a well-founded quantum neurobiology.
Whoa, how do you get to make the jump to the degrees of freedom being my conscious thoughts? Whenever anyone else does that, you call it a deficient ontology, denying reality of experience, vaguing out, etc. But you’re doing the exact same thing!
You have no standing on which to object to someone saying, “The brain state consistent with a certain wavelength of EM radiation hitting my eyes is my conscious experience of blue.”
I plead guilty to talking in a way which is ambiguous about the relationship between the actual thing and its mathematical description. I am frankly not sure what the right way to do so is. My objection to the similar identity statements that people produce is that they can’t explain how the identity could be true, and will even define away the phenomenon they are supposed to be explaining.