On consideration of Robin Z’s earlier example (temperature), I see that in the usual case of reduction, we have a phenomenon (temperature sensations) with a putative cause (“temperature”), and reduction simply clarifies or changes the nature of the cause. But when we have a reductive “explanation” of consciousness, we are engaging with the phenomenon as such and trying to say what sort of thing it is, not what sort of thing it is caused by. And these proposals for what color is are all missing the mark. It is as if I were to say that a violin is really a sentence in a dictionary.
On consideration of Robin Z’s earlier example (temperature), I see that in the usual case of reduction, we have a phenomenon (temperature sensations) with a putative cause (“temperature”), and reduction simply clarifies or changes the nature of the cause. But when we have a reductive “explanation” of consciousness, we are engaging with the phenomenon as such and trying to say what sort of thing it is, not what sort of thing it is caused by. And these proposals for what color is are all missing the mark. It is as if I were to say that a violin is really a sentence in a dictionary.