This is essentially an outside-an-argument argument. If we really had a choice between 50 years of torture and 3^^^3 dust specks, the rational choice would be the 50 years of torture. But the probability of this description of the situation being true, is extremely low.
If you, as a human, in a real-life situation believe that you are choosing between 50 years of torture and 3^^^3 dust specks, almost certainly you are confused or insane. There will not be the 3^^^3 dust specks, regardless of whichever clever argument has convinced you so; you are choosing between an imaginary amount of dust specks and probably a real torture, in which case you should be against the torture.
The only situations where you can find this dilemma in real life are the “Pascal’s mugging” scenarios. Imagine that you want to use glasses to protect your eyes, and your crazy neighbor tells you: “I read in my horoscope today that if you use those glasses, a devil will torture you for 50 years”. You estimate the probability of this to be very low, so you use the glasses despite the warning. But as we know, the probability is never literally zero—you chose avoiding some dust specks in exchange for maybe 1/3^^^3 chance of being tortured for 50 years. And this is a choice reasonable people do all the time.
Summary: In real life it is unlikely to encounter extremely large numbers, so we should be suspicious about them. But it is not unlikely to encounter extremely small probabilities. Mathematically, this is equivalent, but our intuitions say otherwise.
This is essentially an outside-an-argument argument. If we really had a choice between 50 years of torture and 3^^^3 dust specks, the rational choice would be the 50 years of torture. But the probability of this description of the situation being true, is extremely low.
If you, as a human, in a real-life situation believe that you are choosing between 50 years of torture and 3^^^3 dust specks, almost certainly you are confused or insane. There will not be the 3^^^3 dust specks, regardless of whichever clever argument has convinced you so; you are choosing between an imaginary amount of dust specks and probably a real torture, in which case you should be against the torture.
The only situations where you can find this dilemma in real life are the “Pascal’s mugging” scenarios. Imagine that you want to use glasses to protect your eyes, and your crazy neighbor tells you: “I read in my horoscope today that if you use those glasses, a devil will torture you for 50 years”. You estimate the probability of this to be very low, so you use the glasses despite the warning. But as we know, the probability is never literally zero—you chose avoiding some dust specks in exchange for maybe 1/3^^^3 chance of being tortured for 50 years. And this is a choice reasonable people do all the time.
Summary: In real life it is unlikely to encounter extremely large numbers, so we should be suspicious about them. But it is not unlikely to encounter extremely small probabilities. Mathematically, this is equivalent, but our intuitions say otherwise.