This is my reasoning exactly, as I reasoned it out, before reading comments. This seems like the “obvious” answer, at least in the timeless sense. Of course, when reading a problem like this, one more thing you have to bear in mind (outside the problem, of course, as inside the problem you do not have this additional information) is that the obvious solution is unlikely to be fully correct, or else what would be the point of Eliezer posing the problem in the first place… If one is going to accept timeless decision making, then I see no reason not to accept it in cases where it is anchored on fundamental mathematical facts rather than “just” on physical facts like whether or not you will choose to take the money, as in the standard Newcomb’s paradox.
This seems like the “obvious” answer, at least in the timeless sense.
Maybe, but obvious answers to such problems are often wrong. Often, multiple different answers are each obviously the exclusively right answer. And look at all the people in this thread one-boxing. Not so obvious to them.
My reasoning was as stated, but I’m not going to use its “obviousness” as an additional argument in favour of it. And on reading the comments and the Facebook thread, I notice that I have neglected to consider the hypothetical situations in which the two numbers are different. On considering it, it seems that I should still argue as I did, using all the available information, i.e. that on this occasion the two numbers are the same. But it is merely obvious to me that this is so; I am not at all certain.
the obvious solution is unlikely to be fully correct, or else what would be the point of Eliezer posing the problem in the first place...
I’m disinclined to guess the right answer on the basis of predicting the hidden purposes of someone smarter than me. But I can, as it happens, think of a reason for posing a question whose “obvious” solution is completely right. It could be just the first of a garden path series of puzzles for which the “obvious” solutions are collectively inconsistent with any known decision theory.
This is my reasoning exactly, as I reasoned it out, before reading comments. This seems like the “obvious” answer, at least in the timeless sense. Of course, when reading a problem like this, one more thing you have to bear in mind (outside the problem, of course, as inside the problem you do not have this additional information) is that the obvious solution is unlikely to be fully correct, or else what would be the point of Eliezer posing the problem in the first place… If one is going to accept timeless decision making, then I see no reason not to accept it in cases where it is anchored on fundamental mathematical facts rather than “just” on physical facts like whether or not you will choose to take the money, as in the standard Newcomb’s paradox.
Maybe, but obvious answers to such problems are often wrong. Often, multiple different answers are each obviously the exclusively right answer. And look at all the people in this thread one-boxing. Not so obvious to them.
My reasoning was as stated, but I’m not going to use its “obviousness” as an additional argument in favour of it. And on reading the comments and the Facebook thread, I notice that I have neglected to consider the hypothetical situations in which the two numbers are different. On considering it, it seems that I should still argue as I did, using all the available information, i.e. that on this occasion the two numbers are the same. But it is merely obvious to me that this is so; I am not at all certain.
I’m disinclined to guess the right answer on the basis of predicting the hidden purposes of someone smarter than me. But I can, as it happens, think of a reason for posing a question whose “obvious” solution is completely right. It could be just the first of a garden path series of puzzles for which the “obvious” solutions are collectively inconsistent with any known decision theory.
Upvoted for awesome epigram.