So even though you are already in the city, you choose to pay and lose utility in that specific scenario? That seems inconsistent with right-boxing on Bomb.
For the record, my answer is also to pay, I but then again I also left-box on Bomb.
Parfit’s Hitchhiker is not an analogous situation, since it doesn’t take place in a context like “you’re the last person in the universe and will never interact with another agent ever”, nor does paying cause me to burn to death (in which case I wouldn’t pay; note that this would defeat the point of being rescued in the first place!).
But more importantly, in the Parfit’s Hitchhiker situation, you have in fact been provided with value (namely, your life!). Then you’re asked to pay a (vastly smaller!) price for that value.
In the Bomb scenario, on the other hand, you’re asked to give up your life (very painfully), and in exchange you get (and have gotten) absolutely nothing whatsoever.
So I really don’t see the relevance of the question…
Actually, I have thought about this a bit more and concluded Bomb and Parfit’s hitchhiker are indeedanalogous in a very important sense: both problems give you the option to “pay” (be it in dollars or with torture and death), even though not paying doesn’t causally affect whether or not you die.
In the Bomb scenario, on the other hand, you’re asked to give up your life (very painfully), and in exchange you get (and have gotten) absolutely nothing whatsoever.
Like Partfit’s hitchhiker, where you are asked to pay $1000 even though you are already rescued.
since it doesn’t take place in a context like “you’re the last person in the universe and will never interact with another agent ever”
That was never relevant to begin with.
Parfit’s Hitchhiker is not an analogous situation
Well, both problems have a predictor and focus on a specific situation after the predictor has already made the prediction. Both problems have subjunctive dependence. So they are analogous, but they have differences as well. However, it seems like you don’t pay because of subjunctive dependence reasons, so never mind, I guess.
So even though you are already in the city, you choose to pay and lose utility in that specific scenario? That seems inconsistent with right-boxing on Bomb.
For the record, my answer is also to pay, I but then again I also left-box on Bomb.
Parfit’s Hitchhiker is not an analogous situation, since it doesn’t take place in a context like “you’re the last person in the universe and will never interact with another agent ever”, nor does paying cause me to burn to death (in which case I wouldn’t pay; note that this would defeat the point of being rescued in the first place!).
But more importantly, in the Parfit’s Hitchhiker situation, you have in fact been provided with value (namely, your life!). Then you’re asked to pay a (vastly smaller!) price for that value.
In the Bomb scenario, on the other hand, you’re asked to give up your life (very painfully), and in exchange you get (and have gotten) absolutely nothing whatsoever.
So I really don’t see the relevance of the question…
Actually, I have thought about this a bit more and concluded Bomb and Parfit’s hitchhiker are indeed analogous in a very important sense: both problems give you the option to “pay” (be it in dollars or with torture and death), even though not paying doesn’t causally affect whether or not you die.
Like Partfit’s hitchhiker, where you are asked to pay $1000 even though you are already rescued.
That was never relevant to begin with.
Well, both problems have a predictor and focus on a specific situation after the predictor has already made the prediction. Both problems have subjunctive dependence. So they are analogous, but they have differences as well. However, it seems like you don’t pay because of subjunctive dependence reasons, so never mind, I guess.