You did say “Cryonics does not prevent you from dying.” If cryonics works, then I don’t consider the life events that follow resuscitation to be a second life that occured after death, as opposed to a single life with a long inanimate period somewhere in the middle—to me, that just looks like a distinction without a difference. This is an example of the ongoing semantic clash.
I think it is more than just semantics. Unless you are very confident in a cryonic revival, then the emotional experience of dying is not much changed by that distant prospect.
Anyway, it now seems to me that you’ve practiced some form of Dark Side Epistemology
Gosh I hope its not fatal.
in that the fact that after you’re dead you have no preferences seems to be critical to your reasoning.
So you really think you will have preferences after you cease to exist?
So you really think you will have preferences after you cease to exist?
I’m pretty sure it’s hard to fix the temporal context of that utterance. However, this might clear things up:
I currently have preferences regarding things that haven’t happened yet. Even things that will happen after I die! It shouldn’t be too hard to imagine: “I want my great-grandchildren to grow up in a world without violence.” or some such sentiment.
Whether I will have preferences after I die is a different, interesting question, but not particularly relevant to decisions I have to make now; for those, I use my current preferences.
Whether I will have preferences after I die is a different, interesting question, but not particularly relevant to decisions I have to make now; for those, I use my current preferences.
Ok I guess I’m caught up now. So if my current preference is that I am revived at some point after “dying” (which I’ve acknowledged it is), then I should act on it now and sign up for Cryonics, since that is my only chance of that happening later.
The fact that it provides no cure for the “dying experience” doesn’t detract from its possibility to fulfill my current preferences. Got it.
I think it is more than just semantics. Unless you are very confident in a cryonic revival, then the emotional experience of dying is not much changed by that distant prospect.
Gosh I hope its not fatal.
So you really think you will have preferences after you cease to exist?
Or just that is not important that you won’t?
I’m pretty sure it’s hard to fix the temporal context of that utterance. However, this might clear things up:
I currently have preferences regarding things that haven’t happened yet. Even things that will happen after I die! It shouldn’t be too hard to imagine: “I want my great-grandchildren to grow up in a world without violence.” or some such sentiment.
Whether I will have preferences after I die is a different, interesting question, but not particularly relevant to decisions I have to make now; for those, I use my current preferences.
Ok I guess I’m caught up now. So if my current preference is that I am revived at some point after “dying” (which I’ve acknowledged it is), then I should act on it now and sign up for Cryonics, since that is my only chance of that happening later.
The fact that it provides no cure for the “dying experience” doesn’t detract from its possibility to fulfill my current preferences. Got it.
Apparently I fail at convincing people not to sign up.
I hope so too. (I know you’re being sarcastic; I’m being genuine. You can Google it if you don’t know what the term I used means.)
The fact that after I’m dead I have no preferences is not important to my decision-making.
ETA: And, uh, not to be pushy or anything, but the coma scenario...?