The real flaw in Pascal’s Wager isn’t that the probability of getting the desired payoff is extremely low, it’s that the probability of getting the payoff by holding any one belief from a set of different beliefs is the same. For example, the probability of being rewarded for being an atheist by a God who loves epistemic rationalism is at least as big as the probability of being rewarded by Yahweh for being a Christian.
The probability of cryonics getting us the payoff, however, is a lot bigger than the probability that not signing up for cryonics will get us the payoff, so it’s not a Pascal’s Wager type argument to point out that cryonics is worth it even if the probability of it working is very small.
The real flaw in Pascal’s Wager isn’t that the probability of getting the desired payoff is extremely low, it’s that the probability of getting the payoff by holding any one belief from a set of different beliefs is the same. For example, the probability of being rewarded for being an atheist by a God who loves epistemic rationalism is at least as big as the probability of being rewarded by Yahweh for being a Christian.
The probability of cryonics getting us the payoff, however, is a lot bigger than the probability that not signing up for cryonics will get us the payoff, so it’s not a Pascal’s Wager type argument to point out that cryonics is worth it even if the probability of it working is very small.