I hadn’t considered that. I must grant that it’s hard to argue about the issue in a way that’s universally convincing. It quite depends on what you mean by “identical copies”.
Non-diverging cheap mergeable copies (e.g. in the context of additional deterministic whole-universe copies) don’t have much additional weight for me. But copies that are merely identical in their internal state, but (will) have a different external context and thus future are important.
So 3^^^3 is much larger than anything physical in our universe … that doesn’t stop me from entertaining hypotheticals about 3^^^3 (with or without collisions) people.
Maybe I can take as the point that it can’t possibly matter if our intuitions fail at the scale of 3^^^3 (likely they do, but we can do explicit math instead) - it only matters if our intuitions fail at the scale of things that are actually possible in the universe.
I hadn’t considered that. I must grant that it’s hard to argue about the issue in a way that’s universally convincing. It quite depends on what you mean by “identical copies”.
Non-diverging cheap mergeable copies (e.g. in the context of additional deterministic whole-universe copies) don’t have much additional weight for me. But copies that are merely identical in their internal state, but (will) have a different external context and thus future are important.
So 3^^^3 is much larger than anything physical in our universe … that doesn’t stop me from entertaining hypotheticals about 3^^^3 (with or without collisions) people.
Maybe I can take as the point that it can’t possibly matter if our intuitions fail at the scale of 3^^^3 (likely they do, but we can do explicit math instead) - it only matters if our intuitions fail at the scale of things that are actually possible in the universe.