The original post takes the trouble to define “simulation” but not “qualia”. The argument would make much more sense to me if it offered a definition of “qualia” precise enough to determine whether a simulated being does or does not have qualia, since that’s the crux of the argument. I’m not aware of a commonly accepted definition that is that precise.
As it stands, I had to make sure as I was reading it to keep in mind that I didn’t know what the author meant by “qualia”, and after discarding all the statements using that undefined term the remainder didn’t make much sense.
By its very concept, only the person himself can actually observe his own qualia. Qualia are defined that way—at least, in any serious treatment that I’ve seen (aside, of course, from the skeptical and deprecatory ones). This is one of the key elements that make them a problematic concept.
Consciousness—as conceived by many philosophers—is also defined that way. Hence the “other minds problem”—which is the problem that only the person himself can “directly” observe his own consciousness, and other people can at best infer from his behavior, from his similarity to them, etc., that he has consciousness.
So both the concepts of consciousness and of qualia are defined in a way that makes them—by definition—problematic. As far as I know you’re not going to get any qualia believer to define qualia in a way that allows you, a third-party observer, to look at something with a microscope, or telescope, or MRI, or with any other instrument real or physically possible, and personally witness that it has qualia, because qualia are by their nature, or rather by their definition, “directly” perceptible only to the person who has them.
In contrast, the neurons in my brain are no more “directly” perceptible to me than to you. I use the machinery of my brain, but I don’t perceive it. You have as good access to it, in principle, as I do. If you’re my neurosurgeon, then you are a better witness of the material of my brain than I am. This does not hold for qualia.
This is one of the properties of qualia—and indeed of the concept of consciousness as understood by many philosophers—that I find sufficiently faulty as to warrant rejection.
The original post takes the trouble to define “simulation” but not “qualia”. The argument would make much more sense to me if it offered a definition of “qualia” precise enough to determine whether a simulated being does or does not have qualia, since that’s the crux of the argument. I’m not aware of a commonly accepted definition that is that precise.
As it stands, I had to make sure as I was reading it to keep in mind that I didn’t know what the author meant by “qualia”, and after discarding all the statements using that undefined term the remainder didn’t make much sense.
By its very concept, only the person himself can actually observe his own qualia. Qualia are defined that way—at least, in any serious treatment that I’ve seen (aside, of course, from the skeptical and deprecatory ones). This is one of the key elements that make them a problematic concept.
Consciousness—as conceived by many philosophers—is also defined that way. Hence the “other minds problem”—which is the problem that only the person himself can “directly” observe his own consciousness, and other people can at best infer from his behavior, from his similarity to them, etc., that he has consciousness.
So both the concepts of consciousness and of qualia are defined in a way that makes them—by definition—problematic. As far as I know you’re not going to get any qualia believer to define qualia in a way that allows you, a third-party observer, to look at something with a microscope, or telescope, or MRI, or with any other instrument real or physically possible, and personally witness that it has qualia, because qualia are by their nature, or rather by their definition, “directly” perceptible only to the person who has them.
In contrast, the neurons in my brain are no more “directly” perceptible to me than to you. I use the machinery of my brain, but I don’t perceive it. You have as good access to it, in principle, as I do. If you’re my neurosurgeon, then you are a better witness of the material of my brain than I am. This does not hold for qualia.
This is one of the properties of qualia—and indeed of the concept of consciousness as understood by many philosophers—that I find sufficiently faulty as to warrant rejection.