I’m trying to understand your objection, but it seems like a quibble to me. You seem to be saying that the analogy between qualia and gensyms isn’t perfect because gensyms are leaky abstractions. But I don’t think it has to be to convey the essential idea. Analogies rarely are perfect.
You haven’t responded to the broader part of my point. If you want to claim that qualia are computations, then you either need to specify a particular computer architecture, or you need to describe them in a way that’s independent of any such choice. In the the first case, then the architecture you want is probably “the universe”, in which case you’re defining an algorithm by specifying its physical implementation and you’ve affirmed my thesis. In the latter case, all you get to talk about is inputs and outputs, not algorithms.
You seem to be mixing up two separate arguments. In one argument I am for the sake of argument assuming the unproblematic existence of qualia and arguing, under this assumption, that qualia are possible in a simulation and therefore that we could (in principle) be living in a simulation. In the other argument (the current one) I simply answered your question about what sort of qualia skeptic I am.
So, in this argument, the current one, I am continuing the discussion where, in answer to your question, I have admitted to being a qualia skeptic more or less along the lines of Drescher and Dennett. This discussion is about my skepticism about the idea of qualia. This discussion is not about whether I think qualia are computations. It is about my skepticism.
Similarly, if I were admitting to skepticism about Santa Claus, it would not be an appropriate place to argue with me about whether Santa is a human or an elf.
Maybe you are basing your current focus on computations on Drescher’s analogy with Lisp’s gensyms. That’s something for you to take up with Drescher. By now I’ve explained—at some length—what it is that resonated with me in Drescher’s account and why. It doesn’t depend on qualia being computations. It depends on there being a limit to perception.
On further reflection, I’m not certain that your position and mine are incompatible. I’m a personal identity skeptic in roughly the same sense that you’re a qualia skeptic. Yet, if somebody points out that a door is open when it was previously closed, and reasons “someone must have opened it”, I don’t consider that reasoning invalid. I just think the need to modify the word “someone” if they want to be absolutely pedantically correct about what occurred. Similarly, your skepticism about qualia doesn’t really contradict my claim that the objects of a computer simulation would have no (or improper ) qualia; at worst it means that I ought to slightly modify my description of what it is that those objects wouldn’t have.
Ok, I’ve really misunderstood you then. I didn’t realize that you were taking a devil’s advocate position in the other thread. I maintain the arguments I’ve made in both threads in challenge to all those commenters who do claim that qualia are computation.
You haven’t responded to the broader part of my point. If you want to claim that qualia are computations, then you either need to specify a particular computer architecture, or you need to describe them in a way that’s independent of any such choice. In the the first case, then the architecture you want is probably “the universe”, in which case you’re defining an algorithm by specifying its physical implementation and you’ve affirmed my thesis. In the latter case, all you get to talk about is inputs and outputs, not algorithms.
You seem to be mixing up two separate arguments. In one argument I am for the sake of argument assuming the unproblematic existence of qualia and arguing, under this assumption, that qualia are possible in a simulation and therefore that we could (in principle) be living in a simulation. In the other argument (the current one) I simply answered your question about what sort of qualia skeptic I am.
So, in this argument, the current one, I am continuing the discussion where, in answer to your question, I have admitted to being a qualia skeptic more or less along the lines of Drescher and Dennett. This discussion is about my skepticism about the idea of qualia. This discussion is not about whether I think qualia are computations. It is about my skepticism.
Similarly, if I were admitting to skepticism about Santa Claus, it would not be an appropriate place to argue with me about whether Santa is a human or an elf.
Maybe you are basing your current focus on computations on Drescher’s analogy with Lisp’s gensyms. That’s something for you to take up with Drescher. By now I’ve explained—at some length—what it is that resonated with me in Drescher’s account and why. It doesn’t depend on qualia being computations. It depends on there being a limit to perception.
On further reflection, I’m not certain that your position and mine are incompatible. I’m a personal identity skeptic in roughly the same sense that you’re a qualia skeptic. Yet, if somebody points out that a door is open when it was previously closed, and reasons “someone must have opened it”, I don’t consider that reasoning invalid. I just think the need to modify the word “someone” if they want to be absolutely pedantically correct about what occurred. Similarly, your skepticism about qualia doesn’t really contradict my claim that the objects of a computer simulation would have no (or improper ) qualia; at worst it means that I ought to slightly modify my description of what it is that those objects wouldn’t have.
Ok, I’ve really misunderstood you then. I didn’t realize that you were taking a devil’s advocate position in the other thread. I maintain the arguments I’ve made in both threads in challenge to all those commenters who do claim that qualia are computation.