I didn’t mean to imply that virtue ethicists care for things. Quite the opposite!
I haven’t found anything interesting about Bynum or Floridi, but I imagine their information-flavor is orthogonal to the usual distinction between consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue ethicists.
I didn’t mean to imply that virtue ethicists care for things. Quite the opposite!
Ah. Well that’s strange—in my experience, virtue ethicists care for things quite a bit. I know one fellow who (it might be said) values his stringed instruments nearly as much as his children.
I haven’t found anything interesting about Bynum or Floridi, but I imagine their information-flavor is orthogonal to the usual distinction between consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue ethicists.
It’s hard to say… we’re dealing with a new ontology here, so the ethics looks strange.
Nominally, Bynum is some sort of eudaimonist consequentialist, but it would be doing his “flourishing ethics” a disservice to leave it at that. And Floridi’s “information ethics” is at times consequentialist in tone and at times deontic, but it’s hard to say exactly what he’s getting at. At the moment, I don’t even have anything to recommend, but hopefully there will be some worthwhile material in the next few years.
What I should have meant was that the value of the objects is irrelevant to whether a person displays virtue in handling them.
Also, the revealed values of particular virtue ethicists is not so relevant—that fellow is probably just not virtuous. After all, ethicists are the least ethical of philosphers.
I didn’t mean to imply that virtue ethicists care for things. Quite the opposite!
I haven’t found anything interesting about Bynum or Floridi, but I imagine their information-flavor is orthogonal to the usual distinction between consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue ethicists.
Ah. Well that’s strange—in my experience, virtue ethicists care for things quite a bit. I know one fellow who (it might be said) values his stringed instruments nearly as much as his children.
It’s hard to say… we’re dealing with a new ontology here, so the ethics looks strange.
Nominally, Bynum is some sort of eudaimonist consequentialist, but it would be doing his “flourishing ethics” a disservice to leave it at that. And Floridi’s “information ethics” is at times consequentialist in tone and at times deontic, but it’s hard to say exactly what he’s getting at. At the moment, I don’t even have anything to recommend, but hopefully there will be some worthwhile material in the next few years.
What I should have meant was that the value of the objects is irrelevant to whether a person displays virtue in handling them.
Also, the revealed values of particular virtue ethicists is not so relevant—that fellow is probably just not virtuous. After all, ethicists are the least ethical of philosphers.