If it believes something is impossible, then when it sees proof to the contrary it assumes there’s something wrong with its sensory input. If it has utility indifference, then if it sees that the universe is one it doesn’t care about it acts based on the tiny chance that there’s something wrong with its sensory input. I don’t see a difference. If you use Solomonoff induction and set a prior to zero, everything will work fine. Even a superintelligent AI won’t be able to use Solomonoff induction, and it realistically will have Bayes’ theorem not quite accurately describe its beliefs, but that’s true regardless of if it has zero probability for something.
If it believes something is impossible, then when it sees proof to the contrary it assumes there’s something wrong with its sensory input. If it has utility indifference, then if it sees that the universe is one it doesn’t care about it acts based on the tiny chance that there’s something wrong with its sensory input. I don’t see a difference. If you use Solomonoff induction and set a prior to zero, everything will work fine. Even a superintelligent AI won’t be able to use Solomonoff induction, and it realistically will have Bayes’ theorem not quite accurately describe its beliefs, but that’s true regardless of if it has zero probability for something.
That’s not how utility indifference works. I’d recommend skimming the paper ( http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/utility-indifference.pdf ), then ask me if you still have questions.