Cleaner, but less interesting plus I have a entire Demon Games exercise we do on the first day of class. Yes the defense build up, but also everyone going to war even though everyone (with the exception of the Austro-Hungarians) thinking they are worse off going to war than having the peace as previously existed, but recognizing that if they don’t prepare for war, they will be worse off. Basically, if the Russians don’t mobilize they will be seen to have abandoned the Serbs, but if they do mobilize and then the Germans don’t quickly move to attack France through Belgium then Russia and France will have the opportunity (which they would probably take) to crush Germany.
I certainly see how game theory part-explains the decisions to mobilize, and how those decisions part-caused WW2. So far as the Moloch example illustrates parts of game theory, I see the value. I was expecting something more.
In particular, Russia’s decision to mobilize doesn’t fit into the pattern of a one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. The argument is that Russia had to mobilize in order for its support for Serbia to be taken seriously. But at this point Austria-Hungary has already implicitly threatened Serbia with war, which means it has already failed to have its support taken seriously. We need more complicated game theory to explain this decision.
I don’t think Austria-Hungry was in a prisoners’ dilemma as they wanted a war so long as they would have German support. I think the Prisoners’ dilemma (imperfectly) comes into play for Germany, Russia, and then France given that Germany felt it needed to have Austria-Hungry as a long-term ally or risk getting crushed by France + Russia in some future war.
Cleaner, but less interesting plus I have a entire Demon Games exercise we do on the first day of class. Yes the defense build up, but also everyone going to war even though everyone (with the exception of the Austro-Hungarians) thinking they are worse off going to war than having the peace as previously existed, but recognizing that if they don’t prepare for war, they will be worse off. Basically, if the Russians don’t mobilize they will be seen to have abandoned the Serbs, but if they do mobilize and then the Germans don’t quickly move to attack France through Belgium then Russia and France will have the opportunity (which they would probably take) to crush Germany.
I certainly see how game theory part-explains the decisions to mobilize, and how those decisions part-caused WW2. So far as the Moloch example illustrates parts of game theory, I see the value. I was expecting something more.
In particular, Russia’s decision to mobilize doesn’t fit into the pattern of a one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. The argument is that Russia had to mobilize in order for its support for Serbia to be taken seriously. But at this point Austria-Hungary has already implicitly threatened Serbia with war, which means it has already failed to have its support taken seriously. We need more complicated game theory to explain this decision.
I don’t think Austria-Hungry was in a prisoners’ dilemma as they wanted a war so long as they would have German support. I think the Prisoners’ dilemma (imperfectly) comes into play for Germany, Russia, and then France given that Germany felt it needed to have Austria-Hungry as a long-term ally or risk getting crushed by France + Russia in some future war.