I certainly see how game theory part-explains the decisions to mobilize, and how those decisions part-caused WW2. So far as the Moloch example illustrates parts of game theory, I see the value. I was expecting something more.
In particular, Russia’s decision to mobilize doesn’t fit into the pattern of a one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. The argument is that Russia had to mobilize in order for its support for Serbia to be taken seriously. But at this point Austria-Hungary has already implicitly threatened Serbia with war, which means it has already failed to have its support taken seriously. We need more complicated game theory to explain this decision.
I don’t think Austria-Hungry was in a prisoners’ dilemma as they wanted a war so long as they would have German support. I think the Prisoners’ dilemma (imperfectly) comes into play for Germany, Russia, and then France given that Germany felt it needed to have Austria-Hungry as a long-term ally or risk getting crushed by France + Russia in some future war.
I certainly see how game theory part-explains the decisions to mobilize, and how those decisions part-caused WW2. So far as the Moloch example illustrates parts of game theory, I see the value. I was expecting something more.
In particular, Russia’s decision to mobilize doesn’t fit into the pattern of a one shot Prisoner’s Dilemma. The argument is that Russia had to mobilize in order for its support for Serbia to be taken seriously. But at this point Austria-Hungary has already implicitly threatened Serbia with war, which means it has already failed to have its support taken seriously. We need more complicated game theory to explain this decision.
I don’t think Austria-Hungry was in a prisoners’ dilemma as they wanted a war so long as they would have German support. I think the Prisoners’ dilemma (imperfectly) comes into play for Germany, Russia, and then France given that Germany felt it needed to have Austria-Hungry as a long-term ally or risk getting crushed by France + Russia in some future war.