Yes, there’s no commonality to unpleasant experiences in general. Physical pain was just an example where there is (for me) a real thing common to them that I can give a name to, in contrast to “pleasure”, for which there is not.
The fact that we can divide these varying experiences into “pleasant” and “unpleasant” ones does suggest that they have something in common at some level in the brain, though. Then perhaps utilitarianism can be about maximizing expected pleasantness instead of expected pleasure.
I think the point is that you’re comparing Granny Smiths to oranges. If you want to argue that pleasure is less specific than its opposite, to talk about “pleasure” and “displeasure” makes more sense than to talk about “pleasure” and “pain.”
Just to clarify: are you categorically denying the reality of broad categories? Or is there a more subtle point here that deals more with positive feelings?
Yes, there’s no commonality to unpleasant experiences in general. Physical pain was just an example where there is (for me) a real thing common to them that I can give a name to, in contrast to “pleasure”, for which there is not.
The fact that we can divide these varying experiences into “pleasant” and “unpleasant” ones does suggest that they have something in common at some level in the brain, though. Then perhaps utilitarianism can be about maximizing expected pleasantness instead of expected pleasure.
I think the point is that you’re comparing Granny Smiths to oranges. If you want to argue that pleasure is less specific than its opposite, to talk about “pleasure” and “displeasure” makes more sense than to talk about “pleasure” and “pain.”
My purpose was to talk about pleasure, not about pleasure and its opposite. Displeasure is also a non-thing.
Just to clarify: are you categorically denying the reality of broad categories? Or is there a more subtle point here that deals more with positive feelings?