The trouble with this is that it contradicts the Reason for Being Moral In the First Place, as outlined in Elizier’s metaethics. Said reason effectively comes down to obeying moral instincts, after all.
WHY said morality came about is irrelevant. What’s important is that it’s there.
Said reason effectively comes down to obeying moral instincts, after all.
Presumably you mean the post The Bedrock of Morality: Arbitrary?, which is apparently some form of moral realism, since it refuses to attach e- prefix (for Eliezer) or even h- prefix to his small subset of possible h-shoulds. I have not been able to understand why he does it, and I don’t see what h-good dropping it does. But then I have not put a comparable effort into learning or developing metaethics.
WHY said morality came about is irrelevant. What’s important is that it’s there.
I disagree with that. Morality changes from epoch to epoch, from place to place and from subculture to subculture. There is very little “there”, in our instincts. Some vague feelings of attachment, maybe. Most humans can be easily brought up with almost any morality.
There are two seperate questions here, then- one of your metaethics and it’s defensibility, and
Your Metaethics: Request clarification before we proceed.
Eliziers:
Elizier’s metaethics has a problem that your defence cannot solve, and which, I think you would agree, is not addressed by your argument.
I’m more referring to The Moral Void, and am emphasisng that. This shows the fact that morality changes from culture to culture is almost irrelevant- morality constantly changing does not counter any of Elizier’s arguments there.
On point 1: Why are you moral? The whole argument I’ve been trying to make this thread is that Elizier’s moral ideas, though he doesn’t realise it, lead naturally to deontology. You seem to disagree with Elizier’s metaethics, so yours becomes a point of curiosity.
Elizier’s: Clearly your post doesn’t work as a defence of Elizier’s metaethics, as it was not to meant to be, for the most part. But the last pargraph is an exception.
I’ll try a different approach. There is always A morality, even if said morality changes. However, “The Moral Void” and it’s basic argument still works because people want to be moral even if there are no universially compelling arguments.
What do you mean by moral? Why my behavior largely conforms to the societal norms? Because that is how I was brought up and it makes living among humans easier. Or are you asking why the societal norms are what they are?
There is a difference between descriptive and prescriptive. One represents the reasosn why we act. Prescriptive represents the reasons why we SHOULD act. Or in this case, having reflected upon the issue why you want to be moral instead of, say, trying to make yourself as amoral as possible.
Why would you reject that sort of course and instead try to be moral? That’s the proper basis of a metaethical theory, from which ethical choices are made.
I thought I answered that. Descriptive: I was brought up reasonably moral (= conforming to the societal norms), so it’s a habit and a thought pattern. Prescriptive: it makes living among humans easier (rudimentary consequentialism). Rejecting these norms and still having a life I would enjoy would be hard for me and requires rewiring my self-esteem to no longer be linked to being a good member of society. Habits are hard to break, and in this case it’s not worth it. I don’t understand what the fuss is about.
You’re a rationalist- you’ve already had some experience at self-rewiring. Plus, if you’re a decent liar (and that’s not so hard- there’s a good enough correlation between lying and self-confidence you can trigger one through the latter, plus you’re intelligent), then you can either use strategic lies to get up the career ladder or skive on social responsibilities and become a hedonist.
OK, one last reply, since we are not getting anywhere, I keep repeating myself: it does not pay for me to attempt to become “amoral” to get happier. See also this quote. Tapping out.
The trouble with this is that it contradicts the Reason for Being Moral In the First Place, as outlined in Elizier’s metaethics. Said reason effectively comes down to obeying moral instincts, after all.
WHY said morality came about is irrelevant. What’s important is that it’s there.
Presumably you mean the post The Bedrock of Morality: Arbitrary?, which is apparently some form of moral realism, since it refuses to attach e- prefix (for Eliezer) or even h- prefix to his small subset of possible h-shoulds. I have not been able to understand why he does it, and I don’t see what h-good dropping it does. But then I have not put a comparable effort into learning or developing metaethics.
I disagree with that. Morality changes from epoch to epoch, from place to place and from subculture to subculture. There is very little “there”, in our instincts. Some vague feelings of attachment, maybe. Most humans can be easily brought up with almost any morality.
There are two seperate questions here, then- one of your metaethics and it’s defensibility, and
Your Metaethics: Request clarification before we proceed.
Eliziers: Elizier’s metaethics has a problem that your defence cannot solve, and which, I think you would agree, is not addressed by your argument.
I’m more referring to The Moral Void, and am emphasisng that. This shows the fact that morality changes from culture to culture is almost irrelevant- morality constantly changing does not counter any of Elizier’s arguments there.
Sorry, not idea what you are on about. Must be some inferential gap.
On point 1: Why are you moral? The whole argument I’ve been trying to make this thread is that Elizier’s moral ideas, though he doesn’t realise it, lead naturally to deontology. You seem to disagree with Elizier’s metaethics, so yours becomes a point of curiosity.
Elizier’s: Clearly your post doesn’t work as a defence of Elizier’s metaethics, as it was not to meant to be, for the most part. But the last pargraph is an exception.
I’ll try a different approach. There is always A morality, even if said morality changes. However, “The Moral Void” and it’s basic argument still works because people want to be moral even if there are no universially compelling arguments.
What do you mean by moral? Why my behavior largely conforms to the societal norms? Because that is how I was brought up and it makes living among humans easier. Or are you asking why the societal norms are what they are?
There is a difference between descriptive and prescriptive. One represents the reasosn why we act. Prescriptive represents the reasons why we SHOULD act. Or in this case, having reflected upon the issue why you want to be moral instead of, say, trying to make yourself as amoral as possible.
Why would you reject that sort of course and instead try to be moral? That’s the proper basis of a metaethical theory, from which ethical choices are made.
I thought I answered that. Descriptive: I was brought up reasonably moral (= conforming to the societal norms), so it’s a habit and a thought pattern. Prescriptive: it makes living among humans easier (rudimentary consequentialism). Rejecting these norms and still having a life I would enjoy would be hard for me and requires rewiring my self-esteem to no longer be linked to being a good member of society. Habits are hard to break, and in this case it’s not worth it. I don’t understand what the fuss is about.
You’re a rationalist- you’ve already had some experience at self-rewiring. Plus, if you’re a decent liar (and that’s not so hard- there’s a good enough correlation between lying and self-confidence you can trigger one through the latter, plus you’re intelligent), then you can either use strategic lies to get up the career ladder or skive on social responsibilities and become a hedonist.
OK, one last reply, since we are not getting anywhere, I keep repeating myself: it does not pay for me to attempt to become “amoral” to get happier. See also this quote. Tapping out.