Almost any additional punishment would reduce crime. The question is is it worth it?
I meant that it would reduce crime by an amount greater then the amount of suffering the punishment generated.
For example, suppose a man gets fed up and goes on a killing spree, ultimately ending in suicide. However, he has a daughter that he care about and you (somehow) know that he would have been less inclined to go on a killing spree if he thought his daughter would be punished as a result. Would you favor punishing the daughter?
I think punishments are probably too harsh generally.
Are you sure this isn’t just because the image of a harsh punishment is more available then a vague dispersed deterrent effect? Keep in mind, the harsher the punishment, the more effective the deterrent, the less the punishment actually gets carried out.
For example, suppose a man gets fed up and goes on a killing spree, ultimately ending in suicide. However, he has a daughter that he care about and you (somehow) know that he would have been less inclined to go on a killing spree if he thought his daughter would be punished as a result. Would you favor punishing the daughter?
This is an interesting one. The naive answer is that it doesn’t matter who gets punished as long as the incentive is strong enough to overcome the disutility of punishment.
You’d have a hard time showing that the incentive is enough, tho:
This is not a rational defection, so punishment is only partially useful.
Punishing someone else is not as strong a disincentive as punishing the perp.
Family bonds are usually weaker than self preservation, and in many cases,
totally absent. If you modified it to see if the family bonds were strong before punishing someone else, that would create an incentive to not associate with family.
This policy puts a load on the family that is present even if no crime is ever committed.
Putting this load on everybody for the sake of a decrease in an already small crime
rate probably isn’t worth it.
Add in a fourth consideration: If my brother is plotting to overthrow the government and this kind of system is in place I have just been given a massive incentive to assist him in every way possible—and nearly all negative incentive is removed.
This is not a rational defection, so punishment is only partially useful.
Suppose the man also has an “irrational” preference that his daughter not be punished.
Punishing someone else is not as strong a disincentive as punishing the perp. Family bonds are usually weaker than self preservation, and in many cases, totally absent.
In my example the man commited suicide so he obviously didn’t value his own like as much as his daughter’s.
If you modified it to see if the family bonds were strong before punishing someone else, that would create an incentive to not associate with family.
There have existed societies where family members were punished for crimes, what you are describing didn’t happen in those societies.
This policy puts a load on the family that is present even if no crime is ever committed. Putting this load on everybody for the sake of a decrease in an already small crime rate probably isn’t worth it.
I’m not quite sure what you mean by this.
In any case two comments on the style of your reply.
You seem to be trying to argue that this scenario isn’t plausible, I find it much more plausible then your two-month rehab scenario, or for that matter any type of reliable rehab.
You seem to be displaying the symptoms of trying to defend a fake utility function, i.e., trying to argue why your stated preferences won’t force you to do things you find morally repugnant, rather than trying to find preferences that match your intuitions of what’s morally repugnant.
I think it needs to be said that punishment is more about sending a message to future possible-criminals than it is about the guy who actually committed the crime.
I find it much more plausible then your two-month rehab scenario
hmm. I don’t think a magical reliable rehab is likely to be discovered any time soon, But given the magical rehab and magical psychologists, I don’t think there are further problems in my reasoning for rejecting punishment in that case.
I find the idea that family punishment would be an effective method of law to be somewhat implausible.
oh well.
fake utility function
That could be. I will reconsider most of this stuff.
Talking right at the level of what I feel about this, without trying to rationalize from other preferences, I am slightly averse to punishing criminals, but accept it’s necessity in some cases. I am strongly averse to the idea of punishing innocent people, even if it were as effective, I further find it highly unlikely that you could make it effective, but I think that’s unrelated to the preferences.
I meant that it would reduce crime by an amount greater then the amount of suffering the punishment generated.
For example, suppose a man gets fed up and goes on a killing spree, ultimately ending in suicide. However, he has a daughter that he care about and you (somehow) know that he would have been less inclined to go on a killing spree if he thought his daughter would be punished as a result. Would you favor punishing the daughter?
Are you sure this isn’t just because the image of a harsh punishment is more available then a vague dispersed deterrent effect? Keep in mind, the harsher the punishment, the more effective the deterrent, the less the punishment actually gets carried out.
This is an interesting one. The naive answer is that it doesn’t matter who gets punished as long as the incentive is strong enough to overcome the disutility of punishment.
You’d have a hard time showing that the incentive is enough, tho:
This is not a rational defection, so punishment is only partially useful.
Punishing someone else is not as strong a disincentive as punishing the perp. Family bonds are usually weaker than self preservation, and in many cases, totally absent. If you modified it to see if the family bonds were strong before punishing
someone else, that would create an incentive to not associate with family.
This policy puts a load on the family that is present even if no crime is ever committed. Putting this load on everybody for the sake of a decrease in an already small crime rate probably isn’t worth it.
Add in a fourth consideration: If my brother is plotting to overthrow the government and this kind of system is in place I have just been given a massive incentive to assist him in every way possible—and nearly all negative incentive is removed.
Suppose the man also has an “irrational” preference that his daughter not be punished.
In my example the man commited suicide so he obviously didn’t value his own like as much as his daughter’s.
There have existed societies where family members were punished for crimes, what you are describing didn’t happen in those societies.
I’m not quite sure what you mean by this.
In any case two comments on the style of your reply.
You seem to be trying to argue that this scenario isn’t plausible, I find it much more plausible then your two-month rehab scenario, or for that matter any type of reliable rehab.
You seem to be displaying the symptoms of trying to defend a fake utility function, i.e., trying to argue why your stated preferences won’t force you to do things you find morally repugnant, rather than trying to find preferences that match your intuitions of what’s morally repugnant.
I think it needs to be said that punishment is more about sending a message to future possible-criminals than it is about the guy who actually committed the crime.
hmm. I don’t think a magical reliable rehab is likely to be discovered any time soon, But given the magical rehab and magical psychologists, I don’t think there are further problems in my reasoning for rejecting punishment in that case.
I find the idea that family punishment would be an effective method of law to be somewhat implausible.
oh well.
That could be. I will reconsider most of this stuff.
Talking right at the level of what I feel about this, without trying to rationalize from other preferences, I am slightly averse to punishing criminals, but accept it’s necessity in some cases. I am strongly averse to the idea of punishing innocent people, even if it were as effective, I further find it highly unlikely that you could make it effective, but I think that’s unrelated to the preferences.
See the original meaning of “hostage” for some historical examples.
Provided the probability of punishment stays the same.