If in a deterministic universe, no observer B can 100% correctly predict the behavior of subject A, except when B is in the future of A, we can say that subject A has free will.
This strikes me as a very unintuitive definition of free will.
We often talk about free will experientially; defining it based on a specific external observer strikes me as odd. But before I critique that in any way, I’d love more clarification on what you mean by “observer.” Is this anything capable of prediction (e.g. a faithful simulation of the universe)?
But more importantly, I think “100% correctly” is doing the bulk of the work here. I fully agree with your claim that if we define free will in a manner similar to this, we will never reach it. But really, very little outside of statements within self-contained axiomatic systems can ever be held to the standard of 100% certainty. If your concept of free will hinges on the realistically minuscule chance that a random event will alter your decisions substantively, then I ask if this conception still resembles anything like the idea of “free will” as we tend to think of it.
Overall, I concede your claim follows from your definition. But I question the usefulness of such a definition in the first place. I think we can all agree that we cannot have 100% predictive certainty. The question is more whether or not we want to call that shred of uncertainty “free will.” Semantically, I think it’s confusing to call this “free will” when that is not usually the intended meaning of the phrase, but ultimately the decision is somewhat arbitrary as our experience remains the same regardless.
Thank you for your comment. Actually I am trying to build a practical and quantitative model of free will instead of just say free will is or is not an illusion, but I can’t find a better way to define free will in a practical way. That’s why I introduce an “observer” which can make prediction.
And I agree with you, claims like “not 100% correctly” are too weak. But possibly we can define some functions like “degree of free will”, representing how much one subject could be predicted or controlled. I’m not sure if this definition resembles the common meaning of “free will”, but it might be somewhat useful.
I do like the idea of coming up with a good way to quantify the degree of deterministic free will. While it’s not necessarily a useful concept in terms of actionability, when did that ever stop curiosity? I think we can fairly reasonably estimate that this degree of free will is very very low.
In response to defining types of free will, I’d personally propose “experiential free will” and “deterministic free will.” The former refers to the more common usage. When someone says “I have free will” outside of a rigorous philosophical debate, they usually mean “I experience life in such a way that I feel I can make at least some conscious choices about what actions to take.” This is pretty hard to dispute. People do tend to feel this way. This definition of free will may well be an illusion, but that illusion is very much experientially real and worth discussing. It seems like “deterministic free will” might be a better term for what you’re talking about. The idea that free will is a spectrum where the higher the certainty with which your actions can be predicted, the less free will you have.
I want to define “degree of free will” like: for a given observer B, what is the lower limit of event A’s unpredictability. This observer does not have to be human, it can be an intelligence agent with infinite computing ability. It just does not have enough information to make prediction. The degree of free will could be very low for an event very close to the observer, but unable to ignore when controlling a mars rover. I don’t know if anybody has ever described this quantity (like the opposite of Markov Blanket?), if you know please tell me.
I like your distinction between “experiential free will” and “deterministic free will”. As for “experiential free will”, maybe we can focus more on the definition of “reality” and “illusion”. (I am still working on it)
This strikes me as a very unintuitive definition of free will.
We often talk about free will experientially; defining it based on a specific external observer strikes me as odd. But before I critique that in any way, I’d love more clarification on what you mean by “observer.” Is this anything capable of prediction (e.g. a faithful simulation of the universe)?
But more importantly, I think “100% correctly” is doing the bulk of the work here. I fully agree with your claim that if we define free will in a manner similar to this, we will never reach it. But really, very little outside of statements within self-contained axiomatic systems can ever be held to the standard of 100% certainty. If your concept of free will hinges on the realistically minuscule chance that a random event will alter your decisions substantively, then I ask if this conception still resembles anything like the idea of “free will” as we tend to think of it.
Overall, I concede your claim follows from your definition. But I question the usefulness of such a definition in the first place. I think we can all agree that we cannot have 100% predictive certainty. The question is more whether or not we want to call that shred of uncertainty “free will.” Semantically, I think it’s confusing to call this “free will” when that is not usually the intended meaning of the phrase, but ultimately the decision is somewhat arbitrary as our experience remains the same regardless.
Thank you for your comment. Actually I am trying to build a practical and quantitative model of free will instead of just say free will is or is not an illusion, but I can’t find a better way to define free will in a practical way. That’s why I introduce an “observer” which can make prediction.
And I agree with you, claims like “not 100% correctly” are too weak. But possibly we can define some functions like “degree of free will”, representing how much one subject could be predicted or controlled. I’m not sure if this definition resembles the common meaning of “free will”, but it might be somewhat useful.
I do like the idea of coming up with a good way to quantify the degree of deterministic free will. While it’s not necessarily a useful concept in terms of actionability, when did that ever stop curiosity? I think we can fairly reasonably estimate that this degree of free will is very very low.
In response to defining types of free will, I’d personally propose “experiential free will” and “deterministic free will.” The former refers to the more common usage. When someone says “I have free will” outside of a rigorous philosophical debate, they usually mean “I experience life in such a way that I feel I can make at least some conscious choices about what actions to take.” This is pretty hard to dispute. People do tend to feel this way. This definition of free will may well be an illusion, but that illusion is very much experientially real and worth discussing. It seems like “deterministic free will” might be a better term for what you’re talking about. The idea that free will is a spectrum where the higher the certainty with which your actions can be predicted, the less free will you have.
I want to define “degree of free will” like: for a given observer B, what is the lower limit of event A’s unpredictability. This observer does not have to be human, it can be an intelligence agent with infinite computing ability. It just does not have enough information to make prediction. The degree of free will could be very low for an event very close to the observer, but unable to ignore when controlling a mars rover. I don’t know if anybody has ever described this quantity (like the opposite of Markov Blanket?), if you know please tell me.
I like your distinction between “experiential free will” and “deterministic free will”. As for “experiential free will”, maybe we can focus more on the definition of “reality” and “illusion”. (I am still working on it)