For those who are arguing that a theory of non-causation needn’t be considered because it is not predictive, I do not think this is the correct refutation. As spuckblase pointed out in a comment, using the predictive ability to judge the merit of a theory presupposes a causal reality. Fortunately, causal reality is hardly ever challenged.
So what really challenges Hume theory?
In the context of belief in external reality (in the context of considering the intersection of a Hume theory and empiricism), the correct refutation of Hume theory is that while it might be logically conceivable that all the order we see is only chance (like the possibility of flipping heads an infinite number of times), the probability is zero. (ref: Psychohistorian and others.)
However, the general refutation would occur earlier:
Shouldn’t we just stop worrying and accept living in a Hume world? Or are there actual arguments in favour of “real” causation?
Yes. There’s the problem of order.
What order? If there is no causation, then my observations and perceptions are not causally related to reality. According to Hume non-causation, neurons form spontaneously and memories would not be causally related to the past. However, even my belief in the existence of neurons is not causally related to the actual existence of neurons. I have no reason to believe in the experience of anything other than the thoughts of an instantaneous moment in time.
This theory is indistinguishable from solipsism.
Which I believe is refuted only on the basis of being boring after a while?
Now we’re getting to the heart of it. Upvoted.
What does it mean to live in a hume world? For example, we would have to accept the existence of non-reducible mental states (everybody here granted the consistency of the theory until now) and take everything on faith. But indeed we cannnot take anything on faith, since we cannot think, if thinking is a causal notion!?
Suppose for the sake of argument we’re not living in a hume world, but had massive, perhaps infinite computing power. we could simulate so many hume worlds that there are some with order and inhabitants in them. They would then quasi-think, quasi-feel and make quasi-experiences. Everything happens as if there were necessitating laws governing it, but there aren’t. But still, the universe quasi-looks ordered to them.
This theory and solipsism have something in common, but they are distinguishible.
solipsism surely is consistent but higly implausible compared to the standard model. But there could be evidence for it. But it is of another sort than the evidence for a hume world. If pigs start to fly, only hume world-theory (HWT from now on) can explain this easily.
Another point not enough discussed so far are evidences for HWT: causal gaps and anomalies in the fabric of the world as we already know it: In a Causal world, how do we properly deal with mental causation, qualia, time travel paradoxes and in general, indeterministic processes? I’m not saying there are no other solutions, but a lot of people think we did not and possibly cannot make progress in these questions, at least in the current framework. But HWT delivers here.
For those who are arguing that a theory of non-causation needn’t be considered because it is not predictive, I do not think this is the correct refutation. As spuckblase pointed out in a comment, using the predictive ability to judge the merit of a theory presupposes a causal reality. Fortunately, causal reality is hardly ever challenged.
So what really challenges Hume theory?
In the context of belief in external reality (in the context of considering the intersection of a Hume theory and empiricism), the correct refutation of Hume theory is that while it might be logically conceivable that all the order we see is only chance (like the possibility of flipping heads an infinite number of times), the probability is zero. (ref: Psychohistorian and others.)
However, the general refutation would occur earlier:
What order? If there is no causation, then my observations and perceptions are not causally related to reality. According to Hume non-causation, neurons form spontaneously and memories would not be causally related to the past. However, even my belief in the existence of neurons is not causally related to the actual existence of neurons. I have no reason to believe in the experience of anything other than the thoughts of an instantaneous moment in time.
This theory is indistinguishable from solipsism.
Which I believe is refuted only on the basis of being boring after a while?
Now we’re getting to the heart of it. Upvoted. What does it mean to live in a hume world? For example, we would have to accept the existence of non-reducible mental states (everybody here granted the consistency of the theory until now) and take everything on faith. But indeed we cannnot take anything on faith, since we cannot think, if thinking is a causal notion!?
Suppose for the sake of argument we’re not living in a hume world, but had massive, perhaps infinite computing power. we could simulate so many hume worlds that there are some with order and inhabitants in them. They would then quasi-think, quasi-feel and make quasi-experiences. Everything happens as if there were necessitating laws governing it, but there aren’t. But still, the universe quasi-looks ordered to them.
This theory and solipsism have something in common, but they are distinguishible. solipsism surely is consistent but higly implausible compared to the standard model. But there could be evidence for it. But it is of another sort than the evidence for a hume world. If pigs start to fly, only hume world-theory (HWT from now on) can explain this easily.
Another point not enough discussed so far are evidences for HWT: causal gaps and anomalies in the fabric of the world as we already know it: In a Causal world, how do we properly deal with mental causation, qualia, time travel paradoxes and in general, indeterministic processes? I’m not saying there are no other solutions, but a lot of people think we did not and possibly cannot make progress in these questions, at least in the current framework. But HWT delivers here.