Psy-Kosh, your new definition doesn’t help. For example Eliezer Yudkowsky believes in God according to the definition you have just given, both according to the deist part, and according to theist part. Let’s take those one at a time, to illustrate the point:
First part of the definition:
“An ontologically fundamental unique entity that has, in some sense something resembling desire/will, further, this entity deliberately, as an act of will, created the reality we experience.”
Does Eliezer believe in ontologically fundamental entities? Yes. So that’s one element.
Does Eliezer believe in an ontologically fundamental unique entity? Yes, he believes in at least one: he has stated that the universe consists of one unique mathematical object, and as far as I can tell, he thinks it is fundamental. This is clear from the fact that he denies the fundamental nature of anything else. An electron, for example, is not fundamental, since it is simply a part of a larger wave function. It is really the wave function, the whole of it, which is fundamental, and unique.
Does this unique being have something resembling will, by which it created the world? First it is clear that it created the world. I shouldn’t have to argue for this point, it follows directly from Eliezer’s ideas. But does it have anything resembling will? Well, one thing that will does is that it tends to produce something definite, namely the thing that you will. So anything that produces definite results, rather than random results, resembles will in at least one way. And this wave function produces definite results: according to Eliezer all of reality is totally deterministic. Thus, Eliezer believes in a fundamental, unique entity, which created the world by means of something resembling will or desire, i.e. by your definition, he believes in God.
Next question: does this entity directly orchestrate all of reality? It should be obvious that according to Eliezer, yes.
Psy-Kosh, your new definition doesn’t help. For example Eliezer Yudkowsky believes in God according to the definition you have just given, both according to the deist part, and according to theist part. Let’s take those one at a time, to illustrate the point:
First part of the definition:
“An ontologically fundamental unique entity that has, in some sense something resembling desire/will, further, this entity deliberately, as an act of will, created the reality we experience.”
Does Eliezer believe in ontologically fundamental entities? Yes. So that’s one element. Does Eliezer believe in an ontologically fundamental unique entity? Yes, he believes in at least one: he has stated that the universe consists of one unique mathematical object, and as far as I can tell, he thinks it is fundamental. This is clear from the fact that he denies the fundamental nature of anything else. An electron, for example, is not fundamental, since it is simply a part of a larger wave function. It is really the wave function, the whole of it, which is fundamental, and unique.
Does this unique being have something resembling will, by which it created the world? First it is clear that it created the world. I shouldn’t have to argue for this point, it follows directly from Eliezer’s ideas. But does it have anything resembling will? Well, one thing that will does is that it tends to produce something definite, namely the thing that you will. So anything that produces definite results, rather than random results, resembles will in at least one way. And this wave function produces definite results: according to Eliezer all of reality is totally deterministic. Thus, Eliezer believes in a fundamental, unique entity, which created the world by means of something resembling will or desire, i.e. by your definition, he believes in God.
Next question: does this entity directly orchestrate all of reality? It should be obvious that according to Eliezer, yes.
So Eliezer is a theist.